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In this paper, we investigate whether securitization was associated with risky lending in the 
corporate loan market by examining the performance of individual loans held by CLOs.  We 
employ two different datasets that identify loan holdings for a large set of CLOs and find that 
adverse  selection  problems  in  corporate  loan  securitizations  are  less  severe  than  commonly 
believed.  Using  a  battery  of  performance  tests,  we  find  that  loans  securitized  before  2005 
performed no worse than comparable unsecuritized loans originated by the same bank.  Even 
loans originated by the bank that acts as the CLO underwriter do not show underperformance 
relative to the rest of the CLO portfolio. While there is some evidence of underperformance for 
securitized  loans  originated  between  2005  and  2007,  it  is  not  consistent  across  samples, 
performance measures, and horizons. Overall, we argue that the securitization of corporate loans 
is fundamentally different from securitization of other assets classes because securitized loans 
are fractions of syndicated loans. Therefore, mechanisms used to align incentives in a lending 
syndicate are likely to reduce adverse selection in the choice of CLO collateral.   
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1.    Introduction 
In the third quarter of 2007, structured finance markets ground to a halt after nearly a 
decade  of  phenomenal  growth.  Mortgage-backed  securities  (MBSs)  and  Collateralized  Debt 
Obligations  (CDOs)  suffered  a  major  blow  to  their  reputation  after  being  tied  to  a  record-
breaking wave of downgrades and bank losses. Both academics and practitioners have blamed 
securitization for encouraging risky lending and for being responsible, in part, for the recent 
credit crisis. In particular, several empirical studies of MBSs [Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig 
(2010); Seru and Vig (2010); Drucker and Mayer (2008); Nadauld and Sherlund (2009)] have 
shown that securitization resulted in lower lending standards, which led to adverse selection in 
the collateral pools underlying these products.  
In this paper, we focus on collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) which are CDOs backed 
by corporate loans. We analyze the performance of loans purchased by CLOs between 1997 and 
2007 using a battery of performance tests.
1 Contrary to the findings in studies of other forms of 
securitization, we find no consistent evidence that securitized corporate loans were riskier than 
similar loans that were not securitized . When looking separately at the early (1997-2004) and 
late  (2005 -2007)  periods  of  securitization,  we  find  mixed  evidence  concerning  the  
underperformance of securitized loans originated during the latter period. This result is sensitive 
to  the  choice  of  the  sample,  the  horizon  over  which  we  measure  performance ,  and  the 
performance measure  we use. Thus,  even for the later period of securitization there is no 
consistent  evidence  that  adverse selection  played an important role in securitized lending . 
Further, when we examine a subset of securitized loans for which we expect agency problems to 
be particularly pronounced—loans purchased by the CLO from its underwriter—we also find no 
                                                           
  
1 Throughout the paper we refer to loans with CLO lenders in the syndicate as securitized loans or loans purchased 
by CLOs.   Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344068
2 
 
evidence of underperformance regardless of the time horizon, sample, or performance measures 
used.  
While the overall result can be viewed as a negative finding—we find that securitization 
is  not  statistically  significant  in  predicting  poor  performance—there  are  important  positive 
results in our paper: Adverse selection is not an inevitable consequence of securitization, and not 
all securitized markets are the same. The fact that the only evidence on the underperformance of 
securitized loans is weak and concentrated in the second year of among loans originated in the 
2005-2007 period could be due to the passive nature of CLOs and overheated market conditions 
driven  by  large  CLO  issuance  and  institutional  investors‘  demand  for  corporate  loans  more 
broadly (Ivashina and Sun, 2011a).
2 Recent findings by Bord and Santos (2011) indicate,  that 
overheated market conditions over this period were also connected to the reduction in the share 
of the loan (―skin in the game‖) retained by the originating bank.
3  
A potential explanation for the different findings between our paper and those that study 
mortgage securitization has to do with the fact that corporate loans are only partially securitized. 
Corporate loans are significantly larger than mortgages and are typically syndicated; that is, at 
origination, the loans are funded by a group of banks and institutional investors. Fractions of the 
same underlying loan are simultaneously held by multiple CLOs as well as by other institutional 
investors and banks.  In addition,  the bank that originated the loan  (the lead bank)  typically 
retains a fraction of the loan on its balance sheet and each underlying loan is rated. In contrast, 
subprime mortgages are typically sold in one piece to MBS issuers with little to no risk retention 
                                                           
  
2 Consistent with this interpretation, following the 2007-2009 economic crisis, low borrowing costs and loose 
credit standards have returned ahead of the securitization market‘s recovery. See ―Cov-Lite Loans Make a Return‖, 
Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2010; ―Risky loans stage comeback‖, Financial Times, March 13, 2011.   
  
3 The time pattern of shrinkage in ―skin in the game‖ is clearly shown in Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). 3 
 
by  the  originator.  Large  corporate  loans,  therefore,  involve  a  greater  number  of  formal  and 
informal screeners whose reputation is at stake and the loan originator has ―skin in the game‖.  
We argue that the size of the loan and the syndication process make corporate loans less 
prone to adverse selection when securitized. Our view is consistent with a large body of research 
studying the mechanisms that mitigate asymmetric information in market for corporate loans 
[Gorton and Pennacchi (1995); Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Sufi (2007); Drucker and Puri 
(2009); Ivashina (2009)]. These studies find that the lead bank‘s share and the lead‘s reputation 
are the key mechanisms for reducing information asymmetry between the originating bank and 
other  lenders  in  loan  syndication.  Therefore,  syndication  before  securitization  reduces  the 
potential for adverse selection. Moreover, in contrast to residential mortgages corporate loans are 
large.  The  average  securitized  corporate  loan  is  roughly  $522  million  (and  the  minimum 
syndicate participation amount is $1-$5 million) compared to an average loan size of only $150-
$190 thousand for residential mortgages. We argue that if there are fixed costs of monitoring a 
borrower, investors are more likely to monitor larger loans or assets which make their collateral 
pools less susceptible to adverse selection.  
Is  it  trivial  then  that  securitization  of  syndicated  corporate  loans  is  adverse-selection 
proof? Judging by the sudden contraction in CLO issuance (along with other structured issuance) 
in the third quarter of 2007 and the absence of a subsequent rebound, the answer is no (see Fig. 1 
and Fig. 2). A simultaneous disconnect between yields on existing CLO tranches and corporate 
bonds with similar ratings suggests that the market perceived the underlying problem as specific 
to structured finance. Indeed, the disappearance of CLO issuance coincided with the widespread 4 
 
fear that strong demand for securitizable assets may have led to risky lending in the corporate 
sector.
4  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the performance of securitized corporate loans and to suggest that adverse selection is not an 
inevitable consequence of securitization. Our results are consistent with Shivdasani and Wang 
(2009) who find that an increase in securitization did not lead to riskier LBOs. The contribution 
of our study is that we directly observe CLO ownership of a large sample of loans originated 
from 1997 to 2007, which allows us to look at a broader set of corporate transactions and to 
investigate the effect of securitization on the loan market more generally. In a recent paper, Bord 
and Santos (2011) use data from Shared National Credit (SNC) Program to look at securitized 
loan  delinquency.
5  Similarly to our findings,  they show that  underperformance  results are 
concentrated in the late period of securitization and over a long -term horizon. However, Bord 
and Santos (2011) rely on only one discrete measure of performance reported by the banks at an 
annual level. Other papers that look at the securitization of corporate loans include Ivashina and 
Sun (2011a) and Nadauld and Weisbach (2011). Both papers look at pricing of loans purchased 
by CLOs; neither paper examines the performance of securitized loans. We use loan spread as a 
                                                           
  
4 See for example ―Seeds of Credit Crunch Grow in LBO Loan Market,‖ Reuters, 19 June 2007: In the old days of 
relationship banking, banks relied on credit quality control and huge balance sheets to ride out any problems, but 
CLO investors may be more short-term oriented.  Lack of credit quality control by some managers of CLOs is 
particularly frightening to veteran private equity investors.  “What all of this will show - and it will show more as 
CLOs become more popular - is that risk management has not been very well practiced,” said billionaire financier 
Wilbur Ross, founder of private equity firm WL Ross & Co.  Also, ―Easy Money: Behind the Buyout Surge, a Debt 
Market Booms -- CLOs Spark Worries of Volatility and Risk; Loan Standards Loosen,‖ WSJ, 26 June 2007: 
Investors searching for higher yields have put so much money into CLOs that even weak companies can get loans at 
relatively low interest rates…These days, banks that arrange large buyout financings hold on to very little of the 
loans themselves.  Bank underwriting standards have slipped as banks have become mere intermediaries. 
  
5 Although Board and Santos use a different way of identifying securitized loans from the two ways we use in this 
paper, our sample and their sample are very similar in size. Our sample of securitized loans constructed from a 
proprietary data  on CLO loan portfolios and covering 2005-2007 period has roughly 420 loans (plus minus a few 
observations depending on the performance measure). Bord and Santos matched sample covering 2004-2008 has 
596 securitized loan-facilities (without merging SNC data to Compustat or DealScan.)  5 
 
control  variable  in  our  analysis,  thus  differences  in  performance  cannot  be  explained  by 
differences in loan spreads.  
The  differences  between  mortgage  and  corporate  loan  securitizations  in  terms  of  the 
securitization process and the subsequent collateral performance have broad implications for the 
design of securitized assets and provide suggestive evidence in support of the spirit of the recent 
financial legislation. In an effort to reduce agency problems in securitization going forward, 
Section  941  of  the  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  requires 
federal agencies to develop credit risk retention requirements for securitizers and originators. 
Our paper is consistent with the effectiveness of risk retention mechanisms as we study a sector 
of the structured finance market where risk retention by originators existed prior to the new 
legislation.
  
It is worth noting that many CLOs were downgraded or placed on negative credit watch 
during the crisis. While CLO downgrades were partly triggered by deterioration in the credit 
quality  of  corporate  borrowers  during  this  time,  aggressive  adjustments  to  rating  agency 
methodologies also played a role. Despite widespread downgrades, there were very few defaults 
on CLO tranches. According to the LSTA, less than 1% of CLOs rated by Moody‘s defaulted. 
We should stress that our findings do not imply that securitized loans should perform well in 
absolute  terms,  but  rather  that  securitized  loans  should  not  perform  worse  than  other  non-
investment  grade  loans  syndicated  to  non-banks.  This  leaves  open  the  possibility  that  all 
leveraged loans are of an intrinsically worse quality than believed at the time of loan origination. 
Also,  by  design,  CLOs  primarily  acquire  non-investment  grade  securities  so  the  pool  of 
securitized loans should be expected to underperform the overall population of loans. 6 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  in  four  sections.  Section  2  highlights  the  key 
informational frictions involved in the securitization of corporate loans. Section 3 describes the 
data including how we identify securitized loans and measure performance. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Collateralized loan obligations and adverse selection 
Our results are organized around two hypotheses related to the central channels that could 
lead to adverse selection in the quality of CLO collateral: 
H1 (extensive margin): Loans syndicated to CLOs (securitized loans) are worse quality 
than other syndicated loans (unsecuritized loans). 
H2 (intensive margin): Securitized loans arranged by the bank underwriting the CLO are 
worse quality than other securitized loans within the same portfolio. (Notice that the second 
hypothesis—the intensive margin— is conditional on securitization.) 
Since adverse selection in CLO collateral may be only observable ex-post, we focus on 
ex-post performance controlling for loan characteristics at origination,  
2.1.  CLOs and the effects of securitization (H1) 
The key friction underlying the securitization process is asymmetric information about 
loan quality. Fig. 3 illustrates the different steps in the securitization process and the agents 
involved.  To  structure  a  CLO,  a  collateral  manager—typically  an  investment  management 7 
 
company—sets up a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV).
6 The collateral manager 
then assembles a collateral portfolio by acquiring pieces of syndicated corporate loans, engages 
with the underwriter and credit rating agency to structure and rate the deal, and issues securities 
to investors backed by the princip al and interest payments from the loans.  (These CLOs, also 
known as ―cash-flow‖ or ―cash‖ CLOs, are the focus of our paper.) To put together a collateral 
pool a CLO usually participates in over a hundred different syndications. The average CLO size 
is $500 million and the average size of an individual loan holding in a CLO portfolio is $2 to $3 
million. (While the average size of a high yield syndicated loan is $522 million, each participant 
in the syndicate finances only a fraction of the loan, hence the small size of individual loan 
holdings in a CLO portfolio). Because multiple agents are involved, there is an information 
cascade between the originating banks,  the CLO  manager,  and the  ultimate investors in  the 
CLO
7, where the originating bank is best informed and ultimate investors in the CLO are worst 
informed about loan quality. CLOs differ from other institutions that participate in the high yield 
loan market in several ways which could result in CLO managers having weaker incentives to 
screen and monitor than other market participants.  First, CLO managers‘ compensation is only 
weakly tied to deal performance.  CLO managers receive a base fee on the order of 40-50 basis 
points per year, typically senior to all notes (Tavakoli, 2002).  CLO managers are not required to 
hold equity in the deal, but there are cases where they own a share of the equity, receive an 
                                                           
  
6 A bank can structure a CLO backed by originated loans to reduce its risk exposure.  However, the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) reports that in 2007, 97% of corporate loans CLOs were 
structured by financial institutions that did not originate loans and instead acquired pieces of loans at syndication or 
in the secondary market with the purpose of securitization.  This type of CLO—in which the issuer did not originate 
the loans—is referred to as an ―arbitrage CLO.‖ 
  
7 When talking about lenders or investors in loans, we use the term ―CLO investor‖ to refer to special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) that directly invest in syndicated loans.  ―Ultimate investors in CLOs‖ refers to individuals, funds, 
or companies that purchase the securities issued by the CLO (e.g., insurance companies that bought AAA-rated CLO 
tranches).  The difference between these two entities is illustrated in Figure 3.  We classify loan as securitized if it 
was acquired by an SPV.  In the data, we do not observe the ultimate investors in CLOs. 8 
 
incentive  fee  that  is  subordinate  to  equity,  or  have  a  partial  claim  on  the  residual  interest.
8 
Judging from a random sample of CLO rating reports, we estimate that CLO managers have 
equity-like  incentives  in  approximately  50%  of  deals.    However,  a  back  of the  envelope 
calculation suggests that, even in these cases, base management fees are an order  of magnitude 
larger than incentive fees and, therefore, that CLO management is primarily a volume business.
9   
A  second  distinctive  feature  of  CLOs  (compared  to  banks  and  other  investors  in 
syndicated loans) is that their cost of funding is largely determ ined by rating agency models.  
The models used by the credit rating agencies to evaluate CLO portfolios and rate deals rely 
primarily on loan ratings to assess the default risk of the underlying collateral.  As a result, CLO 
managers might select worse quality loans because they exert relatively less effort on collateral 
selection.
10 (Within a given rating class, the CLO manager also has some incentive to select 
loans with a higher spread, however we control for spread throughout the paper.)  
Meanwhile, there are some constraints that should restrict a CLO manager‘s risk taking.  
In particular, downgrades of the collateral can force the manager to pay down notes early, thus 
forgoing an annual fee.  Therefore, a CLO manager cares about deterioration in credit ratings of 
the assets in his portfolio because too many downgrades could lead to deal termination.  The 
manager also faces a reputational constraint. When assets in the collateral pool miss payments or 
                                                           
  
8 An example of an incentive management fee taken from Benmelech and Dlugosz‘s (2009) sample is ―The 
manager receives an incentive fee after equity has achieved and IRR of 14%‖.  An example of a manager having a 
claim on residual interest without having made an equity investment is ―Once equity holders have achieved a 14% 
IRR, residual interest proceeds are split 80/20 between equity holders and the manager.‖ 
  
9 Suppose a CLO manager earns a base fee of 50 basis points per year and has a claim to 20% of residual interest 
after equity achieves an IRR of 14%.  According to Fabozzi, Goodman and Lucas (2006,  p.  370), 18% is an 
optimistic estimate of the return on CLO equity.  Given an average CLO size of $500 million and an average equity 
tranche worth 10% of deal par, the annual base fee would be $2.5 million (0.005*500) while the annual incentive fee 
would be $0.4 million (0.2*(.18-.14)(0.10*500)).   
  
10 At least one rating agency model primarily used rating, maturity, seniority, jurisdiction, and industry to compute 
an expected loss distribution for the underlying collateral.  Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) and Coval, Jurek, and 
Stafford (2009) provide extensive detail on rating models.  Also see the testimony of Eric Baggesen, Senior 
Investment Officer California Public Employees‘ Retirement System before the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform on September 30, 2009. 9 
 
default, the deal‘s equity holders bear the first loss.  If equity holders do not earn an adequate 
return, the manager may have difficulty selling the equity tranche in future deals.  Both of these 
constraints  should  attenuate  agency  problems  between  CLO  managers  and  ultimate  CLO 
investors  in  the  selection  of  the  collateral.  However,  these  mechanisms  are  not  unique  to 
corporate  loan  securitizations  and  given  the  evidence  on  mortgage  securitization,  their 
effectiveness is questionable. 
While  CLOs  have  weaker  incentives  to  screen  and  monitor  than  more  traditional 
participants  in  the  corporate  loan  market,  the  fact  that  the  underlying  loans  in  CLOs  are 
syndicated might counteract the potential negative effects on loan quality. Syndication before 
securitization  is  a  key  difference  between  corporate  loan  securitization  and  mortgage 
securitization.
11  After origination, a subprime mortgage ($150 -$190 thousand on average)  is 
typically sold by the originating lender as part of a pool to other investors. In the case of a 
securitization, this mortgage pool would be used as  part of the collateral held by SPV. At no 
point is any of the individual mortgages split into parts; i.e., there is only one direct claim against 
the borrower who took the original mortgage.  
On the other hand, the loans held by CLOs are syndicated, that is, at origination each loan 
($522 million on average) is  funded by a group of lenders .
12  Every syndicate participant, 
including CLOs, holds a direct pro-rata claim against the borrower. Syndicated loans generally 
involve certain mechanisms that ameliorate asymmetric information between the lead bank and 
                                                           
  
11 Here we are referring to the securitization process for non-conforming mortgages (jumbo, alt-A, and subprime) 
that do not meet criteria for securitization by GSEs.  
  
12 When a company takes out a high-yield syndicated loan the loan package would typically consist of multiple 
pieces also known as facilities, for example: (i) roughly 10% of the package is a revolving line, (ii) another 25-30% 
is a term loan ―A‖, (iii) 50 % is split across first lien institutional facilities (primarily term loan ―B‖); (iv) the rest is 
a subordinate term loan facility senior to any outstanding bonds. Although all facilities are covered by the same loan 
contract, they are typically held by a different investor base. Revolving lines are almost exclusively held by banks. 
Term loan ―A‖ is also syndicated to banks and other tranches—term loan ―B‖ as well as subordinated tranches— 
being syndicated to institutional investors including CLOs.  I.e., a CLO typically holds a fraction of a Term loan B. 10 
 
participants.  These  mechanisms  include  the  lead‘s  reputational  concerns  and  the  implicit 
requirement that the lead bank retain a share of the loan on its balance sheet. Prior research has 
shown that lead banks on average retain 27% of a loan. To the extent that these mechanisms 
continued to function effectively, we might not see a decline in lending standards associated with 
CLOs.  However, it is possible that lead banks‘ incentives to conduct due diligence and monitor 
borrowers have become weaker due to broader syndication resulting from large CLO demand. 
For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show the average share of loans retained by lead 
banks fell dramatically during the 2004-2007 credit expansion.  
Syndication  also  implies  that  even  when  a  loan  is  securitized  (i.e.,  has  CLOs  in  the 
syndicate) there may be other non-CLO lenders in the syndicate as well. If other lenders are able 
to compensate for weak screening and monitoring by CLOs, we might not observe a drop in loan 
quality associated with securitization.  However, CLOs tend to cluster on loans and other lenders 
might have additional motives for investing in particular loans. In particular, other lenders might 
internalize the cost of adverse selection for a given loan because participating in the syndicated 
loan market could lead to other sources of revenue.  For example, ―…the spread offered to pro 
rata investors (banks) is important, but even more important, in most cases, is the amount of 
other, fee-driven business a bank can capture by taking a piece of a loan‖ (Standard and Poor‘s, 
2006.) The same argument is likely to be true for insurance companies.  On the other hand, 
hedge funds and mutual funds could be willing to accept higher risk because they could use 
information obtained in the loan market to trade in other securities (Ivashina and Sun, 2011b).  In 
general, the syndicated loan market is a private market and access to deal flow might be another 
reason why investors would be willing to pay an additional cost on some loans. Ultimately, 
whether securitization led to risky lending in the corporate loan market is an empirical question.   11 
 
 
2.2.   Effects of underwriting in securitization (H2) 
In  addition  to  the  collateral  manager,  a  CLO  has  an  underwriter  (typically  a  bank) 
responsible for screening the loan portfolio and working with the rating agencies to get CLO 
tranches rated, priced, and allocated. In essence, the role of an underwriter in CLO deals is 
similar to the role of an underwriter in stock or bond issuance. As compensation, the underwriter 
receives  a  fee  on  the  notional  value  of  the  deal.  While  the  collateral  manager  has  formal 
authority  over  asset  selection,  the  underwriter  may  exert  influence  over  collateral  choice. 
Although  the  presence  of  an  underwriter  should  improve  the  screening  of  the  underlying 
collateral, underwriting banks may use this channel to sell fractions of their own riskier loans to 
CLOs. Put differently, even if CLOs do not end up with worse quality loans than other loan 
investors on average, they may end up with worse quality loans when they buy them from the 
underwriter of their deal. We estimate that about 10% of loans sold to CLOs were originated by 
the CLO underwriter. 
 
3. Data 
3.1.   Securitized loans sample construction  
To test the first hypothesis we employ two different samples that identify loans held by 
CLOs.  The  first  sample—which  we  refer  to  as  the  ―at-origination  sample‖—includes  loans 
originated  between  1997  and  May  2007.  In  this  sample,  we  determine  whether  a  loan  was 
securitized  by  checking  for  the  presence  of  CLOs  in  the  lending  syndicate  at  the  time  of 
origination and at the time of the first loan amendment. 12 
 
The second sample—which we refer to as the ―portfolio sample‖—is constructed using a 
proprietary source that enables us to observe the complete portfolios of a comprehensive set of 
CLOs. These data consist of monthly CLO trustee reports covering the period between July 2008 
and January 2010. Loans that appear in the CLOs‘ portfolios are labeled as securitized. Below, 
we describe the two samples in more detail and discuss potential selection issues. 
3.1.1.   The first sample: “At-origination sample” 
To identify loans that were purchased by CLOs at origination we start with the sample of 
loans to U.S. companies (public and private) reported in Reuters‘ DealScan containing Term 
loan B or C facilities. We also include all term loans with a credit rating that have non-bank 
institutions, such as hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, distressed funds, or structured 
financial vehicles, in the lending syndicate.  
Generally speaking, there are two distinct investor groups in the loan market: banks (the 
traditional  investors)  and  institutional  investors.  Institutional  investors,  including  CLOs, 
primarily participate in the non-investment grade (leveraged) segment of the loan market and 
compete  for  the  same  loans.  Term  loans  B  and  C  are  specifically  structured  for  non-bank, 
institutional investors. The term loan B or C label refers to a facility within a loan package. Data 
used in the analysis is collapsed to one observation (one facility) per loan. That is, we use the 
Term  Loan  B  facility  where  it  exists.  In  cases  where  institutional  investors  are  part  of  the 
syndicate but there is no Term Loan B facility, we use Term Loan C or Term Loan facilities, in 
that order.  
We follow two steps to identify CLO ownership of loans. First, we search the list of 
lenders at the time of syndication available through DealScan. As a second step, we search the 13 
 
list of lenders at the time of the first loan amendment.
13 The identity of the  lenders (names of 
SPVs)  is  crosschecked  with  a  list of CLOs  constructed  by combining information from : (i) 
Reuters CDO pipeline, (ii)  Standard&Poor‘s (S&P) Quarterly CDO Deal List, and (iii) S&P‘s 
RatingsDirect.  
We  supplement  the  primary  market  information  from  DealScan  with  data  from  loan 
amendments to fully capture all securitized loans. Information available at the time of origination 
might under-report CLO ownership of loans in the presence of warehousing (when banks or 
other institutions temporarily hold loans with the intent of selling them to CLOs). Not being able 
to  observe  CLO  ownership  perfectly  might  lead  us  to  misclassify  securitized  loans  as 
unsecuritized, biasing the results against finding differences in performance between the two 
groups.  
We mitigate this concern by detecting warehousing through loan amendments. Material 
loan  amendments—changes  affecting  the  spread,  maturity,  or  loan  amount—require  the 
unanimous approval of all lenders. In such cases, the signatures and identities of all the lenders 
appear at the bottom of the document. We collect the first material amendment for each loan in 
our sample and search the signers for CLOs. Loan amendments are available to us from 1997 
through 2007; accordingly, we constrain the overall loan sample to this period.  
We classify loans as securitized if there is at least one CLO in the lending syndicate at the 
time of loan origination or at the first loan amendment. The final sample contains 487 loans, 302 
of which we classify as securitized or having CLO investors. 185 loans did not have any CLOs in 
the syndicate at origination or at the time of amendment so we classify them as unsecuritized; 
                                                           
  
13 Amendments and the signing lenders are typically disclosed as a part of 10-Q and 10-K SEC filings (see Ivashina 
and Sun, 2011b).  The focus on the first loan amendment is to assure that it is close to loan origination date, i.e., we 
are capturing loans that were intended to be securitized at origination.   14 
 
these loans constitute our control group. The set of unsecuritized loans is conditional on having a 
material loan amendment, which explains the relatively small sample size. We ran all of the 
reported tests confining the at-origination sample to the 292 loans (out of 302) that had CLOs in 
the syndicate in Dealscan. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results are practically identical and do 
not affect the conclusions. 
For 104 of the 302 securitized loans (34%), we detected additional CLOs in the syndicate 
through  amendments  in  addition  to  those  picked  up  by  DealScan.  However,  of  these  302 
securitized loans, 292 (97%) had at least one CLO in the syndicate at origination according to 
DealScan. In other words, most loans that appear in CLOs at the time of amendment also had at 
least one CLO in the syndicate at origination, which should diminish concerns about under-
identifying securitization because of warehousing.  
We consider several potential sources of selection bias. Tests of the first hypothesis are 
based on a comparison of securitized (treatment group) and unsecuritized (control group) loans. 
To ensure that loans in the control group were not intended for sale to a CLO at origination, our 
control group was constrained to loans with amendments.
14 Yet, our treatment group includes 
loans with and without loan amendments, as long as they had a CLO  in the syndicate  at 
origination. If amended and un-amended loans are fundamentally different then our results could 
be biased. However, it is unclear whether the presence of an amendment  reflects positive or 
negative news. If observable amendments are a reflection of successful renegotiations and loans 
without amendments in fact reflect failed renegotiations, then our control group is on average of 
better  quality.  Alternatively,  if  most  of  the  firms  soliciting  amendments  and  receiving 
                                                           
  
14 This is a conservative criterion because all but ten loans that had CLOs in the syndicate at the time of 
amendment also had CLOs in the syndicate at origination; that is, the presence of a CLO in the syndicate at 
origination appears to be a reliable proxy of whether the loan is securitized.   15 
 
amendments are troubled firms, then our treatment group is on average of better quality. We 
address this issue empirically by re-examining the results in the subsample where treatment and 
control group were constrained to the sample with loan amendments; the results do not change 
our conclusions. 
Overall, we identify 555 unique CLO investors corresponding to 302 securitized loans. 
On average, our sample contains 6 loans per CLO. The median size of a CLO issued during that 
period was $460 million (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009) and the average minimum investment 
in  the  institutional  loan  market  is  $5  million,  hence,  as  a  lower  bound,  six  loans  represent 
roughly 6% of the collateral pool.
15 While the at-origination sample provides only a partial look 
at each CLO‘s collateral pool, we identify some loans for approximately 60% of outstanding 
U.S. CLOs.  
3.1.2.   The second sample: “Portfolio sample” 
The  second  sample  used  in  the  analysis  comes  from  Creditflux,  a  leading  global 
information source for credit trading and investing which maintains a comprehensive database of 
CDOs and credit hedge funds. We have the entire Creditflux CLO database, which includes 
monthly trustee reports detailing the complete investment portfolios for a large set of CLOs 
covering the period between July 2008 and January 2010. We hand match the loan portfolios to 
DealScan and Compustat. Matching to DealScan returns 2,297 unique U.S. corporate loans. The 
sample covers 277 U.S. CLOs issued between 1999 and 2008. Using the total CLO volume 
tracked by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), and assuming 
that CLOs, on average, have a par value of $500 million, we estimate that our sample covers 
                                                           
  
15 Many CLOs are not 100% invested or hold other types of securities in addition to corporate loans.  Most CLOs 
are structured as ‗revolving pools‘ that allow the manager to turnover 10 to 20% of the collateral per year for the 
first five to seven years of the typical twelve year life of a CLO. 16 
 
46%  of CLOs  issued between 2003  and  2007. (This  is  a  lower-bound estimate of  coverage 
because the SIFMA statistics include synthetic CLOs.) On the other hand, comparing this sample 
to the one in Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) indicates that the new sample covers 65% of deals 
issued between 2003 and 2007. (This is likely to be an upper-bound because Benmelech and 
Dlugosz (2009) only look at S&P rated vehicles.)  
 In this sample, any loan that appears in a CLO‘s portfolio is categorized as securitized. 
As before, a sample of unsecuritized loans is drawn from the set of loans in Dealscan that have 
Term Loan B or C facilities or are held by other institutional investors more broadly. We limit 
the treatment and control groups to loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007 that 
mature between 2010 and 2015 for two reasons. First, our CLO portfolio observations span the 
period from 2008 to 2010. We could misclassify earlier loans as unsecuritized if they matured 
before our CLO portfolio observations start. Second, the focus of our study is the performance of 
loans  that  were  originated  with  the  intent  of  being  sold  to  CLOs.  Securitization  (CLOs‘ 
purchases of loans) in the corporate loan market is a continuous process as opposed to a one-shot 
deal as in the MBS market. CLOs are allowed to turnover a limited portion of their collateral for 
the first few years of their life and loans trade on the secondary market. As a result, loans that 
were not  owned by CLOs at  origination  might  end up  in  a CLO portfolio  later on. This  is 
especially true for the period of 2008 and beyond. Over this period, very few new loans were 
originated and many companies went bankrupt, expanding CLOs‘ penetration of the loan market. 
Thus, the potential challenge in the portfolio sample is the opposite of the one we face in the at-
origination sample; we are concerned that we could misclassify loans as securitized (type II 
error). Limiting the treatment and control groups to loans originated between January 2006 and 
July 2007 renders similar results. 17 
 
We should also consider the reverse, that is, the possibility that a loan that was held by 
CLOs at origination could later be sold. Using data from our ―portfolio sample‖, we find that 
CLOs tend to hold loans for long periods of time. If a CLO holds a loan in a given month, the 
probability of this loan still being part of the CLO portfolio in the next month—condition on the 
loan  still  outstanding—is  96%  (93%  three  month  later  and  89%  six  month  later).  This  is 
consistent with Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) who study CLO rating reports and find that the 
average CLO permits only limited trading during the first third to half of the deal maturity. Thus, 
only a small fraction of the CLO portfolio is sold and therefore is unlikely to introduce type I 
error where we misclassify loans as securitized.  
 
4.  Results 
4.1.  Measuring performance 
Both of our hypotheses are motivated by the asymmetry of information between different 
parties  involved  in  the  securitization  process.  Since  we  cannot  directly  observe  the  more 
informed party‘s true opinion of a given loan ex-ante, we proxy for it by examining ex-post 
performance, controlling for observables at the time of loan origination. For example, if loans 
sold to CLOs are unobservably worse quality than other syndicated loans, they should perform 
worse controlling for loan and borrower characteristics at origination.  
 We use a battery of loan and borrower performance measures for our analysis. These 
measures are: (i) secondary market loan prices, (ii) loan-level credit rating changes, (iii) changes 
in the borrower‘s market-assessed probability of default as measured by changes in credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads, (iv) borrower credit quality measured by implied default probability from a 
reduced form version of Merton‘s (1974) distance-to-default model, and (v) violations of loan 18 
 
covenants. As mentioned earlier, we use only one facility per loan because loans are securitized 
at the facility level. Loan-market prices are facility-level. Credit ratings correspond to the senior 
(first-lien) facilities within a loan package including the facility that we consider for the analysis. 
CDS spreads also correspond to senior debt. Covenant violations affect all facilities under the 
loan package. Implied default probability is a borrower-level measure.  
Secondary  loan  market  prices  and  CDS  spreads  are  dynamically  updated,  forward-
looking measures of performance. One advantage of these measures is that they are not restricted 
to publicly traded companies. Many of the loans in our sample are related to a leveraged buyout 
for which publicly available information ceases to exist after the firms go private. However, 
loans and CDS contracts continue to trade even if a company is taken private, allowing us to 
measure performance for private firms as well. Still, secondary market loan prices and CDS 
spreads  are  only  available  for  large  and  liquid  names  thus  restricting  the  sample  to  largest 
borrowers. To overcome this problem we also look at changes in credit ratings, implied default 
probability,  and  covenant  violations.  Credit  ratings  are  not  updated  continuously  and  are  a 
discrete  measure  of  performance,  thus  implied  default  probability  and  covenant  violations 
provide  a  finer  measure  of  performance.  While  each  of  these  performance  measures  has  its 
limitations,  taken  together  they  provide  a  comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  performance  of 
securitized loans.  
4.1.1.  Secondary market loan prices 
Loan-market prices are probably the most direct measure of loan performance. We obtain 
loan price data from two sources. Data for 2006-2010 is from the Loan Syndications and Trading 
Association  (LSTA)  Thomson  Reuters  LPC  Mark-to-Market  (MTM)  Pricing  which  contains 
monthly averages for bid and ask quotes by facility. The data for 1998 through 2004 is from 19 
 
Altman, Gande and Saunders (2010). The daily data starts in November 1999, before that we 
have monthly and weekly quotes. Taken together, we have secondary market loan prices from 
1998 to 2010 excluding 2005.  
The LSTA reports quotes and not traded prices, but these are the numbers used for MTM 
purposes. LSTA runs a quarterly study on accuracy by comparing MTM prices to trade prices. 
According  to  LSTA  MTM  prices  historically  have  been  a  ―very  accurate‖  proxy  of  the 
transaction prices.
16 On a daily basis, dealers price what LSTA requests, which is based on the 
loans held by the lender base. According   to LSTA, the pricing service requests pricing on 
essentially  all leveraged syndicated bank loans.   As of May 2011, LSTA was pricing 2,600 
individual loan facilities from 1,325 U.S. borrowers. Generally the way the process works is that 
one (or many) customers of the service will add a new loan to their portfolio and then the pricing 
analysts will research the deal and request pricing from the lead banks that  arranged the deal. 
Multiple dealers price the loans. For a quote to be reported, at least two dealer s are required to 
report information. LSTA reports equally-weighted average quote across all reporting dealers.  
Not all the loans are traded and not all traded loans are sufficiently liquid to have quotes. 
Our results using secondary loan prices are conditional on loans being traded; furthermore they 
are conditional on loans being traded in the first year following loan origination  for at least 6 
consecutive months. 40% of loans in the at-origination sample and 16% of loans in the portfolio 
sample meet this requirement and have  loan price data. The average first bid in our sample is 
99.9 bps (median of 100.3 bps). Gupta, Singh and Zebedee (2008) classify facilities as liquid ―if 
on any day after origination there is a price quote for that loan in our secondary market database, 
                                                           
  
16 LSTA looks at each loan that traded in a given quarter and compares the transaction and MTM price on trade 
date. For example, according to the study for the first quarter of 2011 the mean absolute differential between all 
trade and MTM prices was 49 bps, the median 25 bps. 20 
 
and its ﬁrst quoted bid price is greater than 98 (par loan)‖; out of the overall DealScan sample 
15% of facilities meet this criteria. Under this criteria, all loans in our sample are very liquid. 
This is also confirmed by the fact that a bid-ask spread for loans in our sample is below 1 bps. 
Overall this is consistent with the fact that secondary loan market liquidity is largely driven by 
institutional  investors  as  we  focus  on  the  loans  syndicated  to  institutional  investors  (LSTA, 
2007.)  
To  standardize  the  data  over  the  entire  sample,  we  convert  everything  to  monthly 
averages. For each of the facilities in our sample, we calculate the percentage change in loan 
prices in two years after loan origination (two windows, year one and year two). To construct the 
secondary market price change for a given year we calculate the percentage difference between 
the average mid-quotes in the first and last month within a year window.(Mid-quotes are an 
average of bid and ask.) Thus, for a loan originated on January 5, 2005 that starts to trade 
immediately and trades for the next two years, the first year price change is computed using 
average mid-quotes corresponding to January 2006 and January 2005. To assure that the price 
changes are not driven by outliers we control for the annual price volatility computed using 
monthly averages. 
4.1.2.  Credit ratings 
The second measure we examine is downgrades and upgrades of Moody‘s and S&P‘s 
loan  ratings.  Loan  ratings  correspond  to  senior  secured  loan  facilities  and  come  from 
GoldSheets. Rating data covers the period between May 2001 and April 2010. We count rating 
changes if at least one of the rating agencies modified its assessment of the loan. Our rating scale 
incorporates credit watches so that ‗downgrades‘ include placements onto negative credit watch 
and ‗upgrades‘ include placements onto positive credit watch.  21 
 
Over 99% of facilities in both the at-origination sample and the portfolio sample are 
senior  secured  making  these  ratings  the  appropriate  measure  of  performance.
17  Seniority is 
assigned at the loan facility level. If several facilities within the same loan package are senior 
secured debt, these facilities are governed by the same loan contract and they receive the same 
priority in repayment. The exception to this rule are second -lien (subordinated or mezzanine) 
facilities, however, these represent a very small faction of the syndicated loans. Moreover, Term 
loan B‘s—the focus of our study—are by definition first-lien loans. We should also note that 
when a syndicated loan is outstanding, seniority is constrained to first-lien facilities within the 
loan package as no other debt with the same seniority can be outstanding or issued later due to 
the  negative  covenants  included  in  a  typical  loan  contract.  In  that  sense,  changes  in  senior 
secured  credit  ratings  reflect  performance  of  the  first-lien  facilities  and,  specifically,  the 
institutional facilities in our sample.  
Using credit ratings as a measure of performance potentially introduces a bias against 
finding underperformance of securitized loans as CLO managers would like to pick borrowers 
that will have stable ratings. Credit ratings are central inputs to the CLO evaluation models used 
by the rating agencies and models are typically re-run at regular intervals after issuance to check 
compliance.  In  addition,  most  CLOs  include  covenants  that  restrict  the  manager‘s  asset 
allocation  by  credit  rating.  Violating  these  covenants  or  failing  a  ratings  test  can  trigger 
accelerated pay-down of the notes or require the manager to adjust the collateral pool through 
sales and purchases.  
4.1.3.  Credit default swaps  
                                                           
  
17 Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) also report that most CLOs are required to hold no less than 90% of their 
portfolio in senior secured loans.  Given that CLOs typically hold 5-10% of non-loan collateral in their portfolios, 
the share of loans in CLOs that is senior secured is even higher. 22 
 
We obtain CDS data from Markit for the period between 2003 and June 2009. CDS 
spreads measure the amount an investor would have to pay to insure against a company‘s default. 
As a company‘s default risk rises, its CDS spread increases. We use daily quotes for the CDS 
corresponding to  the 5-year  contract  on senior unsecured  debt. Thus, changes  in  these CDS 
spreads reflect changes in the default risk of obligations at the same level of seniority as the 
institutional facilities in our sample.  
For each of the loans in our sample, we calculate the percentage change in CDS in two 
years after loan origination (two windows, year one and year two). Within a given year window, 
we use first  and last  CDS  quotes  to  construct  our measure. We  also  control  for the annual 
volatility computed using daily CDS quotes in  the six months prior to the beginning of the 
performance window. 
4.1.4.  Implied probability of default 
Since only a subset of companies in our sample have CDS trading, we also calculate 
implied default probabilities using the reduced form Merton (1974)-style model described in 
Bharath and Shumway (2008). Specifically, we look at the change in the borrower‘s implied 1-
year default probability following loan origination (two windows, year one and year two). The t-
1  implied  default  probability  (Πt-1)  is  measured  as  of  month-end  in  the  month  before  loan 
origination.  For  example,  for  a  loan  originated  on  January  5,  2005,  the  t-1  implied  default 
probability is measured as of month end of December 2004. The change in the implied default 
probability over year one is the difference between the values as of month-end December 2005 
and month-end December 2004. The year two change is calculated as the difference between 
month-end December 2006 and month-end December 2005.   23 
 
This measure is based on accounting and stock information, so we can only compute it 
for firms with valid data available in Compustat and CRSP. Furthermore this is the most indirect 
measure of loan performance as it reflects overall borrower creditworthiness. But unlike credit 
ratings and covenant violations it is a continuous measure of performance. 
4.1.5.  Loan covenant violations 
Data  on  loan  covenant  violations  is  compiled  from  reading  remarks  for  the  loan 
amendments as reported in DealScan.
18 Covenant structure is typically set at the loan  package 
level. In other words, a covenant violation would affect every facility under the loan package . 
Similar to credit ratings and implied default probability, covenant violations are not constrained 
to firms with traded loans or CDS. Given that covenant violations do not necessary lead to credit 
rating downgrades they represent a finer measure of performance. However, covenant violations 
are rare (although not as rare as corporate defaults) . Due to the limited number of observations 
we restrict the analysis to univariate results and report it as a robustness check. 
4.2.  Summary statistics 
We begin by reporting descriptive statistics for both samples. As shown in Table 1, Panel 
A, institutional loans are large loans made to large borrowers; the average loan size is roughly 
$600 million and the average borrower had roughly $1.7 billion in sales at the time of loan 
origination.  Generally  speaking,  loans  purchased  by  CLOs  are  non-investment  grade  senior-
                                                           
  
18 These remarks records waivers of covenants violations in addition to any changes to the loan contract that might 
or might not be triggered by a covenant violation. We read through the comments that contain search words 
―waive‖, ―failure‖, ―violation‖ or ―non-compliance‖ to assure that these indeed had to do with financial covenants 
violations.   24 
 
secured loans with ratings in the BB or B range and spreads in the neighborhood of 300 basis 
points.
19 
In comparing the two samples, it is important to keep in mind their relative differences . 
The at-origination sample covers a longer period of time (loans originated  1997-2007 versus 
2005-2007). However, it conditions on the presence of a loan amendment (i.e., availability of 
SEC filings), which effectively eliminates some smaller loans (the average loan in the at -
origination sample is $560 million while the average l oan in the portfolio sample is $464 
million).  Table 1,  Panel  B  presents  a  more  extensive  description  of  the borrowers, using 
Compustat data for the fiscal year ending prior to loan origination . Looking at the portfolio 
sample, securitized loans and borrowe rs are larger than their unsecuritized counterparts on 
average,  but  not  significantly  different  on  other  dimensions .  In  the  at -origination  sample, 
securitized loans are smaller (as a result of conditioning on amendment) but borrowers are not 
significantly different in size. Securitized borrowers look riskier on some dimensions, however, 
including  leverage  and  interest  coverage .  Next  we  examine  whether  loan  and  borrower 
characteristics predict securitization in a multivariate setting. 
[TABLE 1] 
Table 2 examines how ex-ante loan and borrower characteristics influence the probability 
of securitization; this repeats the analysis in Table 1 in a multivariate setting. We estimate a 
probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a loan was securitized and 
zero otherwise; the independent variables are loan and borrower characteristics at origination. 
All regressions include lead arranger fixed effects, in addition to fixed effects for the borrower‘s 
                                                           
  
19 Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) find that CLOs are typically backed by collateral pools with a weighted average 
rating of BB-/B+/B.  Many restrict the amount of securities rated below CCC+ to 5-7 percent of the pool, suggesting 
that the average loan held by a CLO has a BB or B rating. 
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industry, credit rating at loan origination, and the year of loan origination. On balance, larger 
loans are more likely to be sold to CLOs, though the effect is more pronounced in the portfolio 
sample  as  expected  given  the  sample  construction.  In  the  portfolio  sample,  a  one  standard 
deviation increase in the log of loan size (1.3) is associated with an 11 percentage point increase 
in  the  probability  of  securitization.  Also  in  the  portfolio  sample,  various  other  loan 
characteristics are significant in predicting securitization. LBO loans, loans to public companies, 
and loans with higher spreads are more likely to be sold to CLOs.  
[TABLE 2] 
4.3.   Hypothesis I: Does securitization predict worse future performance? 
4.3.1.  Benchmark results 
The  first  set  of  tests  examines  whether  securitized  loans  are  worse  quality  than 
comparable unsecuritized loans. All regressions are estimated at the loan level with lead arranger 
fixed effects so the coefficient on the securitization dummy can be interpreted as the marginal 
effect  of  securitization  on  performance  among  loans  originated  by  a  given  bank.  The  at-
origination sample includes loans originated between January 1997 and May 2007. The portfolio 
sample  includes  loans  originated  between  January  2005  and  July  2007.  To  allow  for  the 
comparison of coefficients across samples, we include two securitization dummies, Securitized 
and Securitized in 2005-2007, in the at-origination sample regressions. Securitized in 2005-2007 
is essentially an interaction term reflecting the marginal effect for securitized loans originated 
between 2005 and 2007. The total effect of securitization for loans originated in 2005-2007 in 
the at-origination sample is given by the sum of these coefficients (Securitized and Securitized in 
2005-2007). For each regression on this sample, we provide the p-value corresponding to the 
statistical test that the sum of these coefficients is equal to zero (i.e., the null hypothesis that 26 
 
there is no difference in the performance of securitized and unsecuritized loans originated during 
the later period). Each specification includes year fixed effects, so we control for level effects in 
2005, 2006 and 2007 individually. We also include industry effects when the dependent variable 
is not already industry-adjusted and fixed effects for credit ratings at loan origination.  
Other  controls  include  log  of  loan  maturity  measured  in  years,  the  log  of  loan  size 
measured in millions of dollars, and the loan‘s spread over LIBOR contracted at loan origination 
and  measured  in  basis  points.  (Our  results  are  not  sensitive  to  whether  we  use  log 
transformations  of  particular  explanatory  variables  or  not.)  The  spread  contracted  at  loan 
origination controls for the risk that is priced by a broad investor base at that time. For example, 
a loan originated in 2006 paying 150 bps over LIBOR could be classified as risky or highly 
levered even if no other information were available. If we ignore the contracted spread we might 
miss  this  fact.
20  We also include an indicator variable equal to one if the contract   includes 
performance pricing. Performance pricing allows for the original spread to be adjusted based on 
the financial performance of the borrower; presence of the performance pricing feature is likely 
to indicate borrowers with more transparent  accounting performance.  When looking at loan 
prices  (a  facility-level  variable)  we  include  facility -level  size  controls .  Notice  that  by 
construction our sample only includes term loan facilities.
21 Throughout the analysis we control 
for loan purpose, specifically we look at whether the loan was issued to fund an LBO, a merger 
or  acquisition,  or  debt  repayment  (i.e.,  recapitalization) .  The  omitted  categories  of  loan 
                                                           
  
20 We also run our benchmark results excluding the spread from the right hand side, however, this change has no 
effect on the results for H1 and limited effect on H2. More broadly, ratings (or any other observable information) are 
not a sufficient statistic for explaining the spreads. Ivashina (2009) models spreads in which she controls for ratings 
any many other observables at the time of origination; the R-squared of such model is approximately 0.55.  
  
21 Holdings of revolving lines by CLOs are very rare (we confirm this in the portfolio sample).  Furthermore 
because our measure of securitization is a dummy it would be very unlikely that in a given loan package CLOs hold 
a revolving line but not a term loan. 27 
 
purpose—working  capital  and  general  corporate  purpose—can  be  broadly  grouped  as  real 
investments.  
Table 3 examines whether securitized and unsecuritized loans perform differently on the 
secondary market post-origination, controlling for observables. The dependent variable is the 
percentage  change  in  the  bid  price  in  a  window  around  origination.  The  key  explanatory 
variables are the securitization indicators: Securitized, and Securitized in 2005-2007. The results 
suggest that securitized loans originated before 2005 outperform unsecuritized loans from the 
same lead bank on the secondary market. The outperformance is only significant in the second 
year, when these loans experience price appreciation 4.8 percentage points greater than that of 
unsecuritized loans on average. The results are mixed for loans originated between 2005 and 
2007, depending on the sample.  In the at-origination sample, there appears to be a trend of 
deterioration over time, as evidenced by the negative coefficients on Securitized in 2005-2007, 
however this is only a marginal effect. The total effect of securitization for loans  originated 
2005-2007 in this sample is given by the sum of the securitization coefficients (Securitized + 
Securitized  in  2005-2007).  As  shown  by  the  p-value  for  the  F-test,  we  cannot  reject  the 
hypothesis that the sum of these coefficients is equal to zero.  In other words, securitized loans 
issued during the late period do not underperform in the at-origination sample.  However, they 
do underperform in the portfolio sample. In the portfolio sample, securitized loans experience a 
decrease in price 2.0 percentage points greater than comparable unsecuritized loans in the same 
window. These differences are economically significant since the mean change in loan price over 
the horizon is 3% for the at-origination sample and -6% for the portfolio sample and the standard 
deviations are 11% and 13% respectively. However, given the significant drop in liquidity in the 
secondary  loan  market  around  the  financial  crisis,  we  cannot  definitively  attribute  the 28 
 
underperformance of securitized loans to deterioration in fundamentals. For additional evidence, 
we turn to other measures. 
[TABLE 3] 
In Table 4, we examine whether securitized loans are more likely to be downgraded or less 
likely to be upgraded than comparable unsecuritized loans originated by the same lead bank. 
Panel  A  presents  the  downgrade  results  and  Panel  B  presents  the  upgrade  results.  In 
specifications  for  the  at-origination  sample,  Securitized  in  2005-2007  is  an  interaction  term 
between  Securitized  and  the  2005-2007  loan-origination  window.  Due  to  the  issues  with 
interaction effects in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton, 2003)—specifically that the coefficients 
on interaction terms cannot be interpreted as marginal effects and may even have the opposite 
sign—all  regressions  are  estimated  with  a  linear  model  to  maintain  consistency  across 
specifications.  Controlling  for  loan  and  borrower  characteristics  at  origination,  we  find  no 
support for the hypothesis that securitization predicts deterioration in credit ratings for loans 
originated before 2005. As before, the results are mixed for loans originated between 2005 and 
2007. The results are statistically significant only in  the portfolio sample, indicating that for 
loans originated between 2005 and 2007, downgrades are more likely particularly in the second 
year following loan origination. Our results suggest that loans securitized in 2005-2007 are 12 
percentage points more likely to be downgraded in a two year window after origination than 
comparable  unsecuritized  loans.  This  is  economically  significant  because  the  unconditional 
probability of a downgrade over this period is 25%. Although upgrades appear to be less likely 
for  the  same  sub-sample,  the  estimates  are  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  However, 
upgrades  are  significantly  less  likely  for  loans  originated  in  2005-2007  in  the  at-origination 
sample.  29 
 
[TABLE 4] 
Our third measure of performance is CDS spreads. The dependent variable in Table 5 is 
the percentage change in borrower‘s CDS spreads in a given window following loan origination. 
A positive coefficient indicates an increase in CDS spreads or deterioration in credit quality. We 
omit industry fixed effects in the at-origination sample due to the small sample size. Controlling 
for  the  borrower‘s  credit  rating  and  lagged  CDS  volatility,  we  find  that  securitized  loans 
originated before 2005 experience similar performance to unsecuritized loans.
22 The results for 
the  subset  of  loans  originated  between  2005   and  2007  are  mixed  with  evidence  of 
outperformance, although not consistently across the two samples. In the at-origination sample, 
borrowers with securitized loans originated 2005-2007 experience a decline in CDS spreads that 
is 221 percentage points larger than that of comparable unsecuritized borrowers. This seemingly 
outsized differential is likely the product of the small sample and the disruption in CDS markets 
due to heightened concerns about counterparty credit risk  during the crisis. Between mid-2007 
and year-end 2008, the median CDS spread for speculative grade companies increased from 
under  250  bps  to  nearly  750  bps.  Roughly  10%  of  the  4 4  companies  in  our  regression 
experienced  an  increase  in  CDS  spreads  of  more  than  100%  during  th e  window  under 
examination. While these large changes in spreads are not likely to be driven by data errors 
(Markit requires a minimum number of quotes to report a sp read) the magnitude of the effect 
may reflect factors other than the credit quality of the underlying companies and  limit the 
interpretive power of the result.  
                                                           
  
22 We do not control for Compustat variables here because conditioning on companies being public would reduce 
the sample.  One of the main benefits of using CDS spreads is that they exist for private companies. 
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Next we examine another measure of default probability that gets around the issues with 
CDS spreads: implied default probability from a reduced-form Merton (1974) model.  Table 6 
compares  changes  in  one-year  implied  default  probabilities  for  securitized  and  unsecuritized 
borrowers  around  loan  origination.    Again  we  find  no  significant  difference  in  performance 
between securitized and unsecuritized borrowers in either sample regardless of the period in 
which the loan was originated.  
[TABLES 5& 6] 
None of these performance measures is perfect, however taken together the four different 
measures  provide  a  comprehensive  overview  of  performance.  To  summarize,  controlling  for 
observables at the time of loan origination, securitized loans originated before 2005 perform 
similarly to other institutional loans from the same lead arranger that are unsecuritized. We find 
some evidence that securitized loans originated in the later period underperform over the two 
year horizon, but only in the portfolio sample (as discussed earlier, this sample is sensitive to 
type II error). There is no evidence of underperformance for securitized loans originated between 
2005-2007in  the  at-origination  sample.    Furthermore,  even  for  the  portfolio  sample,  results 
across different performance measures do not consistently indicate underperformance.  
The results indicate that agency problems in loan securitization may be less important 
than commonly believed. Despite the fact that CLOs are subject to additional layers of agency 
and adverse selection problems, their investment choices appear no different than the investment 
choices  of  other  non-lending  institutions  (in  terms  of  ex-post  performance).  The  results  on 
securitized loans originated during the boom years of 2005-2007 are mixed, depending on the 
sample and the performance metric. We find some weak evidence of underperformance in loan 
prices and credit ratings. The fact that the performance difference is concentrated among loans 31 
 
originated in the 2005-2007 and in the second year performance window raises issues about 
overheated market conditions and the passive nature of CLOs and not necessarily incentives for 
securitization  of  corporate  loans  per  se.  We  interpret  these  findings  as  indicative  of  the 
contribution  of  CLOs  to  overall  demand  pressure  by  institutional  investors  that  led  to  a 
deterioration in lending standards (e.g., Ivashina and Sun, 2011a) and was also associated with 
shrinking loan retention by originating banks (see  Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010 and, more 
recently, Bord and Santos, 2011).  
4.3.2.  Addressing selection 
In both samples, we limit attention to loans that are likely candidates for securitization to 
assure that securitized and unsecurititized loans are comparable. However, in the absence of a 
clear mechanism that explains the selection of loans into CLOs there might be some residual 
concern that the treatment and control subsets are not comparable. To address this issue in Table 
7 we explore a quasi-experimental setting, where we rely on temporary imbalances between 
CLO demand for loans and loan originations. The argument is that CLOs face an investment 
constraint which they cannot smooth over time. We consider several proxies for the aggregate 
imbalance between supply and demand at the quarterly frequency: (i) CLO issuance (CLO fund 
flow); (ii) the change in the CLO pipeline, which reflects CLO volume that is not yet closed; (iii) 
CLO issuance scaled by total term loan issuance. For robustness, we also look at the overall net 
cash flow into institutional accounts scaled by total term loan issuance. An increase in any of 
these variables represents an increase in either CLO demand or institutional demand. CLO flow 
data is compiled using CLO calendars published by Reuters Gold Sheets. Institutional fund flow 
data is from S&P LCD Quarterly Review covering activity in the leveraged loan market. Total 32 
 
term loan issuance is constructed using DealScan. Both types of fund flow data are available 
from 2001 through 2009.  
Aggregate trends, in particular at the overall institutional level, are likely to be exogenous 
to the loan selection made by any individual CLO. The basic intuition is that an increase in 
aggregate demand for loans should push CLOs to invest in loans that would typically be held by 
other institutional investors. If the loans typically held by CLOs are of a different quality (than 
unsecuritized loans), we would expect the marginal loans purchased by CLOs during these times 
to differ from the average quality of CLO collateral. (Given the exogenous nature of the demand 
proxies,  the  quality  of  the  overall  pool  of  potentially  securitizable  loans  is  likely  to  be 
unchanged; in other words, under pressure, CLOs reach into the pockets of other institutional 
investors.) Table 7 replicates the tests presented for the first hypothesis (Tables 3-6) with the 
alternative proxies for CLO demand for loans. In addition to controls used in the analysis in 
Tables 3 to 6 we include a demand proxy and its interaction with the Securitized dummy; these 
interaction terms are the coefficients of interest. Coefficients on benchmark controls and fund-
flow proxies are omitted for compactness of presentation. Because we use several proxies for 
high  CLO  demand,  the  2005-2007  interaction  term—i.e.,  an  indicator  for  the  height  of  the 
securitization boom—would be redundant. 
Out of 40 coefficients of interest (40 interaction terms from 40 different regressions) 36 
are not statistically different from zero. This indicates that when temporarily higher loan demand 
by  CLOs  pushes  them  to  invest  in  loans  that would  typically  be  held  by  other  institutional 
investors, these loans are no better or worse than average securitized loan. Among the significant 
coefficients, three out of four actually indicate that securitized loans are on average better quality 
than unsecuritized loans because their marginal investments during times of demand pressure 33 
 
underperform. This evidence is consistent with the findings in Tables 3 through 6; loans with 
CLO investors are no different than loans held by other institutional investors.
23  
 [TABLE 7] 
4.4. Hypothesis II: Does securitization by the originator predict worse future performance?  
In this section, we examine the performance of a subset of securitized loans for which we 
expect agency problems to be particularly pronounced. Adverse selection problems could be 
particularly acute when banks engage on both sides of the loan market—originating loans and 
underwriting CLOs that purchase loans for collateral. This presents the greatest opportunity for a 
bank to sell poor quality loans to a CLO, because there is one less monitor of loan quality at the 
CLO level.  
Since we cannot identify the seller of loans in the secondary market, we limit the sample 
to primary market purchases for this part of the analysis (hence, we only use the information in 
Dealscan for the at-origination sample). This ensures that the loan‘s lead arranger sold the loan to 
the CLO. We separate primary market purchases of loans by CLOs into two groups: cases where 
the loan arranger is the CLO underwriter (same bank) and cases where the loan arranger is 
different from the CLO underwriter (different bank). Then we compare post-origination borrower 
performance across the two types of loans, within a given CLO portfolio, using three different 
performance  measures.  We  omit  CDS  tests  because  the  sample  of  same  bank  loan  x  CLO 
observations  with  CDS  spreads  is  small.  Note  that  in  order  to  compare  the  performance  of 
different  loans within the same CLO portfolio, we are using a  (loan x CLO)  dataset.  In all 
                                                           
  
23 In addition to the results reported in Table 7, we also look within the sample of the loans held by CLOs and test 
whether, controlling for loan size, the number of CLOs in the syndicate or the share of the loan allocated to CLOs 
predicts future loan performance.  Because corporate loans are not fully securitized and are held by other investors 
including banks, we expect that larger CLO presence will be associated with worse quality loans.  However, the 
intensity of CLO investment has no predictive power for performance in our regressions. 34 
 
regressions, we include CLO fixed effects and cluster standard errors by loan. Given that our 
comparison is between two groups of securitized loans, it is unlikely that the results are driven 
by unobservable factors that might explain why some loans are securitized. Thus, by studying the 
intensive margin of securitization we alleviate some of the concerns about the endogeneity of the 
securitization decision itself. Additionally, we only include CLOs for which we have a clearly 
identified underwriter. 
Table 8 examines secondary market loan performance across both types of loans. As 
before, the dependent variable is the percentage change in the mid-quote (the average of the bid 
and ask quotes) in a window around origination. On average, loans purchased from the CLO 
underwriter experience more price appreciation on the secondary market after loan origination 
than other loans in the same CLO portfolio. In the year one, same bank loans originated before 
2005  experience  a  0.1  percentage  point  larger  price  appreciation;  in  year  two,  it  is  a  0.9 
percentage  point  differential.  Same  bank  loans  originated  between  2005  and  2007  seem  to 
underperform same bank loans originated between 1997 and 2004 (i.e., marginal effect for 2005-
2007) in year two. However, the total effect for loans originated in the late period is given by the 
by the sum of the Same bank and Same bank in 2005-2007 coefficients. As shown by the p-value 
for the F-test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that same bank loans originated during this period 
perform the same as other securitized loans.  Also, the mean one-year price change in our sample 
is around 1-2% with a standard deviation of around 10%. While some performance differences 
are statistically significant, they do not appear strongly economically significant, especially in 
year one.  
Table 9 examines whether the sale of a loan by its lead arranger into one of its own CLOs 
predicts downgrades or upgrades in loan ratings. Panel A presents the downgrade results and 35 
 
Panel B presents the upgrade results. The signs on the same bank coefficients indicate that in the 
two years after origination, borrowers whose loans are sold to CLOs underwritten by their lead 
arranger are  more likely to be downgraded and less likely to be upgraded than other loans in the 
same  CLO.  Although  the  economic  magnitudes  appear  to  be  non-trivial,  the  results  are  not 
statistically significant regardless of the loan vintage. 
In Table 10, we examine implied default probabilities from the reduced-form Merton 
model. While the number of observations in the sample is large, the number of same bank loans 
in the sample is relatively small (only around 150) and the performance comparison is made 
among loans within a given CLO portfolio. For this reason we have to drop a set of fixed effects 
in order to estimate the regression.  We drop year fixed effects because the majority of loans 
acquired  by  a  given  CLO  tend  to  be  acquired  over  a  limited  period  of  years  around  CLO 
issuance.  So the within-portfolio comparison would naturally help to limit the vintage of loans 
being compared. The results show that companies whose loans are bought by CLOs underwritten 
by their lead arranger outperform other borrowers whose loans are held in the same portfolio 
over a one-year horizon and underperform over a two-year horizon.  While the differences seem 
economically large (the average change in default probability in our sample is 2.4%), they are 
again statistically not different from zero regardless of the loan vintage.   
[TABLES 8 -10] 
Overall, the evidence rejects the hypothesis that banks that participate on both sides of 
the market, originating loans and underwriting CLOs, exploit their private information to the 
detriment of CLO managers. By some measures, loans purchased from the CLO underwriter and 
originated before 2005 outperform other loans in the same portfolio.   
4.4.   Robustness Check: Loan covenant violations 36 
 
As  a  robustness  check,  we  examine  one  additional  measure  of  loan  performance:  the 
frequency of financial covenant violations. Table 11 summarizes covenant violations for the 
samples that correspond to the two hypotheses tested in the paper. Covenant violations are rare 
for the loans in our sample: only 6% of loans in the at-origination sample and less than 1% of 
loans in the portfolio sample experienced a covenant violation. We present univariate results 
because of the large number of fixed effects required in our benchmark specifications. As shown 
in the first four columns of the table, securitized loans are no more likely to experience covenant 
violations than unsecuritized loans in both samples regardless of the loan vintage. Naturally, the 
probability that a poorly performing borrower violates a loan covenant depends on the nature of 
the covenant package included in the loan. The disappearance of covenants from loan contracts 
during the recent boom was well documented in media reports and industry newsletters. We find 
no evidence that securitized loans have fewer covenants except in one case:  securitized loans 
originated pre-2005 (arguably before cov-lite loans became popular) have 0.28 fewer financial 
covenants on average.  This raises the possibility that the reason why securitized loans originated 
before 2005 do not violate covenants at a higher rate than their unsecuritized counterparts could 
be that they have fewer covenants to begin with.  However, in a multivariate setting with our 
standard controls, there is no significant difference in the incidence of covenants.  In summary, 
securitized loans do not appear to violate loan covenants at a higher frequency than unsecuritized 
loans which supports the results from the other performance regressions.  
[TABLE 11] 
5.     Conclusion 
Using a unique dataset on loans used as CLO collateral we provide the first insight on 
whether securitization led to risky lending in the corporate loan market. Contrary to the adverse 37 
 
selection hypothesis, we find that securitized loans were of similar quality as unsecuritized loans 
sold to other institutional investors. Our paper highlights the uniqueness of securitization in the 
corporate  loan  market.  In  particular,  corporate  loans  purchased  by  CLOs  are  syndicated.  A 
securitized loan that is held by CLOs can simultaneously be held by mutual funds, hedge funds 
and other non-bank financial institutions. In general, to be able to attribute underperformance 
results to incentives within CLOs, we must understand incentives not only of originating lenders 
but also of other investors in the lending syndicate.  
Our findings indicate that adverse selection in the securitization of corporate loans is at best 
weak. These results stand in sharp contrast to the findings on mortgage securitization and 
provide a broad insight about structured finance products: Adverse selection is not an inevitable 
consequence of securitization. ―Skin in the game‖ on the part of the originating lender and 
distribution among investors may be sufficient to alleviate concerns about adverse selection in 
collateral pools. This is consistent with the risk retention requirements like those outlined in the 
Dodd-Frank Act. However, another important point that emerges from our paper is that there are 
vast differences in the securitization process, and the attendant incentive problems, across 
structured asset classes. To that extent, the one-size-fits-all approach to risk retention taken in the 
financial reform bill could miss its mark and have the unintended effect of limiting the supply of 
credit to firms.38 
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Fig. 1. CLO issuance. The figure is compiled using weekly CLO calendars published by Reuters, Gold Sheets. The pipeline indicates CLOs that 
have not yet closed (i.e., been fully invested.) 
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Fig. 2. Quarterly global CDO issuance, 2005-2008. This figure is compiled using issuance data published by the Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (SIFMA). Structured finance corresponds to global CDO issuance backed by collateral that is itself structured (e.g., 
residential and commercial mortgages-backed securities, asset-backed securities, credit default swaps, or other CDOs). For example, mortgages 
are usually pooled into pass-through securities before they are purchased by CDOs.  
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Fig. 3. CLO Structuring. This figure illustrates different steps involved in the securitization of corporate loans and highlights involvement of 
different agents (CLO manager, Underwriter, etc.) during the separate stages of the process.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for both samples. The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. The portfolio sample includes 
loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. Statistics are also split based on the two main hypotheses tested in the paper. Same bank (H2) indicates loans that appeared 
in a CLO underwritten by their lead arranger. Loan variables are constructed using DealScan. Minimum assignment is the minimum investment for syndicate participants. Sales at 
close is taken at the time the loan is closed. Leverage (loan) is the size of the loan divided by the borrower‘s sales at close. All-in-drawn spread is defined as total (fees and 
interest) annual spread paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down from the loan net of upfront fees. Senior debt rating and Loan rating come from Reuters Gold Sheets 
(compiled from S&P and Moody‘s). Performance pricing dummy indicates that the spread on the loan is tied to the firm's financial indicators. LBO, M&A and Debt repayment 
dummies indicate the purpose of the loan. In Panel B, financial data corresponds to the fiscal year that ended just prior to loan origination. Industries are measured at the 2-digit 
SIC code level and industry adjusted figures have the industry median subtracted for the corresponding fiscal year. Compustat variables: Leverage is Total Long-Term Debt plus 
Debt in Current Liabilities divided by Total Assets. Loan size/Assets is the loan size from DealScan divided by Compustat‘s Total Assets. Interest coverage is EBITDA divided by 
Interest and Related Expense. Return on assets (ROA) is EBITDA divided by Total Assets. Q is [Assets + Market Value of Equity – Book Value of Equity – Deferred 
Taxes]/Assets. Z-score is defined as in Altman (1968). In Panel B, the number of observations corresponds to the loans for which pre-origination assets is available. All dollar 
figures are measured in millions.  
 
Panel A: Loan terms 
 
    H1: Effects of securitization    H2: Effects of underwriting 
    At-origination sample  Portfolio sample    At-origination sample 
    Securitized:  Diff.  Securitized:  Diff.    Same bank:  Diff. 
    Yes  No  t-stat  Yes  No  t-stat    Yes  No  t-stat 
Number of loans    302  185    1,084  2,508      104  198   
Loan size  Mean  522  623  1.96  738  346  9.39    614  474  2.61 
Minimum assignment  Mean  3.5  3.4  0.56  3.3  3.5  1.33    3.1  3.8  2.42 
Sales at loan close  Mean  1,788  1,680  0.38  2,617  1,280  3.51    1,711  1,831  0.30 
Leverage (loan)  Mean  0.72  0.87  1.65  1.09  1.02  0.93    0.70  0.73  0.35 
All-in-drawn spread (bps)  Mean  304  313  0.81  288  278  1.82    289  313  1.62 
All-in-drawn spread (bps)  Median  275  300    275  250      275  300   
Senior debt rating (borrower)  Mean  B+/B  B+/B  1.58  B+/B  B+  4.32    B+  B+/B  1.79 
Senior debt rating (borrower)  Median  B+  B+    B  B      B+  B+   
Loan rating  Mean   BB-/B+  BB-/B+  1.29  B+  BB-/B+  3.27    BB-/B+  BB-/B+  0.91 
Loan rating  25
th %  BB-  BB-    BB-  BB-      BB-  BB-   
Loan rating  Median  BB-/B+  BB-    B+  B+      BB-  B+   
Loan rating  75
th %  B+  B+    B  B      B+  B+   
Perf. pricing (dummy)   Mean  0.38  0.40  0.52  0.14  0.11  2.14    0.41  0.36  0.95 
LBO loan (dummy)  Mean  0.44  0.29  3.35  0.61  0.39  12.5    0.45  0.43  0.38 
M&A loan (dummy)  Mean  0.13  0.18  1.80  0.10  0.12  1.47    0.14  0.12  0.70 
Debt repayment loan (dummy)   Mean  0.09  0.13  1.75  0.03  0.01  3.93    0.05  0.12  1.94 
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Table 1 – continued 
 
Panel B: Borrower characteristics (sample matched to Compustat) 
 
  At-origination sample 
  Portfolio sample   
  Securitized loans  Unsecuritized loans  Diff. 
  Securitized loans  Unsecuritized loans  Diff. 
  (Obs.=220)  (Obs.=166)   
  (Obs.=347)  (Obs.=634)   
  Median  Mean  SD  Median  Mean  SD  t-stat 
  Median  Mean  SD  Median  Mean  SD  t-stat 
Total assets  944  2,184  3,742  804  2,107  4,179  0.19 
  1,253  8,180  46,292  882  3,140  8,216  2.67 
Net sales  782  2,022  3,406  611  1,642  2,790  1.17 
  1,110  4,405  15,641  698  2,447  8,141  3.51 
Market cap.  576  1,144  2,206  603  1,314  2,075  0.66 
  1,048  2,326  3,568  800  2,543  5,737  0.57 
Loan size/Assets  0.42  0.55  0.50  0.44  0.63  0.63  1.41 
  0.49  11.2  115  0.38  3.18  50.9  1.51 
Leverage  0.51  0.53  0.36  0.42  0.44  0.29  2.70 
  0.43  0.56  1.53  0.37  0.48  1.25  0.92 
Interest coverage  2.78  5.60  11.9  3.06  13.6  60.7  1.87 
  3.53  24.8  249  4.39  31.1  431  0.24 
Return on assets  0.12  0.12  0.07  0.12  0.12  0.09  0.11 
  0.11  0.07  0.85  0.12  0.09  0.65  0.41 
Z-score  2.12  4.15  14.7  2.26  9.70  40.0  1.54 
  2.63  13.7  115  2.95  19.4  113  0.62 
Q  1.33  1.50  0.62  1.41  1.54  0.68  0.42 
  1.60  2.15  3.80  1.53  2.07  3.31  0.32 
Return on equity  0.07  0.01  1.23  0.07  0.55  4.03  1.90 
  0.09  0.01  3.05  0.10  -0.03  2.34  0.20 
PPE/Assets  0.44  0.52  0.36  0.42  0.50  0.34  0.73 
  0.44  0.53  0.43  0.46  0.55  0.41  0.59 
Leverage (ind. adj.)  0.23  0.27  0.37  0.17  0.21  0.29  1.87 
  0.21  0.33  1.54  0.14  0.26  1.25  0.79 
Interest coverage (ind. adj.)  -0.31  2.30  11.7  0.10  10.3  60.3  1.88 
  -0.89  20.0  250  -0.45  25.9  433  0.23 
Return on assets (ind. adj.)  0.04  0.05  0.10  0.03  0.06  0.10  0.06 
  0.02  -0.02  0.86  0.02  0.01  0.66  0.48 
Z-score (ind. adj.)  -0.92  0.71  14.8  -1.26  5.60  40.0  1.36    -1.28  9.41  115  -0.93  15.0  113  0.61 
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Table 2 
Determinants of securitization: Loan and borrower characteristics at origination 
This table examines the impact of loan and borrower characteristics on the probability that a loan is sold to a CLO. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a loan was sold to a CLO and 0 if not. The at-origination sample includes loans originated 
between 1997 and May 2007. The portfolio sample includes loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. Borrower financials 
are taken from Compustat for the fiscal year ending prior to loan origination and industry adjustment is done at the 2-digit SIC level. The 
Compustat dummy equals 1 when a company has pre-origination data available in Compustat. Other variable definitions are the same as 
in Table 1. All specifications include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating 
at origination, and the identity of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies 
for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated. The coefficients shown are marginal effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by loan lead arranger in all specifications. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, 
and 
*, respectively. 
 
  At-origination sample  Portfolio sample 
  Coeff.  z-stat    Coeff.  z-stat    Coeff.  z-stat    Coeff.  z-stat   
Borrower characteristics:               
       
  Log(Assetst-1)  0.05  1.65 
*  -0.09  3.36 
***  -0.02  1.09    -0.03  1.76 
* 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.50  1.24 
  0.87  2.23 
**  -0.19 
.19 
2.04 
**  -0.01  0.30   
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.50  3.83 
***  --   
  -0.08  1.71 
*  --     
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.01  1.76 
*  --   
  0.00  1.48    --     
  Z-scoret-1 (ind. adj.)  --  -- 
  -0.01  3.82 
***  --      -0.00  0.35   
  Compustat (dummy)  -0.45  3.34 
***  0.21  0.98 
  0.30  1.75 
*  0.29  1.61 
 
Loan characteristics:     
     
             
  Log (Loan maturity)  -3.35  2.60 
***  -3.84  3.11 
***  5.15  4.53 
***  4.54  2.88 
*** 
  Log(Loan size)  -0.08  1.87 
*  0.00  0.03 
  0.09  4.29 
***  0.11  3.75 
*** 
  All-in-drawn spread (bps)  -0.00  0.64 
  -0.00  0.08 
  0.00  1.03 
  0.00  1.31 
 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  -0.07  1.14 
  -0.15  2.48 
**  0.01  0.13    0.02  0.31   
  LBO loan (dummy)  0.04  0.40 
  -0.07  0.49 
  0.17  3.16 
***  0.21  2.77 
*** 
  M&A loan (dummy)  0.10  0.77 
  0.12  0.83 
  0.05  0.78    0.06  0.69   
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.01  0.15 
  0.02  0.17 
  0.09  1.09 
  0.20  1.89 
* 
Fixed effects:     
     
             
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y      Y/Y   
  Y/Y      Y/Y     
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y      Y/Y   
  Y/Y      Y/Y     
           
             
Pseudo R-squared  0.29      0.35      0.26      0.30     
Observations  361      265      738      539     
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Table 3 
Does securitization predict worse future performance? (H1): Secondary market loan prices 
This table compares the change in secondary market loan prices for securitized loans and unsecuritized loans. The unit of 
observation for the analysis is a loan. For each loan we use prices corresponding to the relevant facility (i.e., we only use one facility per 
loan). The dependent variable is the percentage change in the average monthly mid-quote price (the average between the bid and ask 
price) in a given period after the loan origination. Facility level controls include facility size as a percentage of the total deal size, and a 
dummy equal to 1 when the facility starts after the loan origination date (the coefficient on the latter is not reported because it only 
affects one specification.) The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. The portfolio sample 
includes loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. Securitized in 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction term reflecting the 
marginal effect for loans securitized between 2005 and 2007, which we include for comparison across the two samples. The p-value 
corresponds to the statistical test of the null hypothesis that Securitized + Securitized in 2005-2007=0. Other variable definitions are the 
same as in Table 1. All specifications include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and 
rating at origination, and the identity of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate 
dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated.  Standard errors are clustered by loan 
lead arranger. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
 
  At-origination sample  Portfolio sample 
 
0-12 months          
post-event 
13-24 months 
 post-event 
0-12 months            
post-event 
13-24 months         
post-event 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat    Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat   
Securitized (dummy)  -0.011  1.34 
  0.048  2.35  **  --   
  --     
Securitized in 2005-2007  -0.007  0.90 
  -0.027  0.20    0.003  1.39 
  -0.020  2.45 
*** 
Borrower characteristics:   
     
     
     
 
  Realized price volatility  -2.262  4.02 
***  -1.229  4.86 
***  -2.835  10.5 
***  -1.553  3.46 
*** 
Loan characteristics:     
     
     
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  0.004  0.31 
  0.022  0.71 
  -0.077  0.91 
  0.140  0.60 
 
  Log(Loan size)  0.009  1.36 
  -0.007  0.54 
  0.001  1.57 
  -0.004  0.63 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  0.000  0.91 
  -0.000  0.88 
  0.000  0.69 
  0.000  0.04 
 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  0.000  0.05 
  -0.025  1.91 
*  -0.003  0.84 
  -0.007  0.95 
 
  LBO loan (dummy)  -0.001  0.09 
  0.044  1.78 
*  0.002  0.31 
  0.003  0.16 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  0.004  0.27 
  0.036  1.18 
  -0.000  0.07 
  0.012  0.69 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.001  0.06 
  0.074  2.45 
***  0.001  0.24 
  -0.030  2.10 
** 
  Facility size (% of deal)  0.000  1.07 
  -0.001  2.18 
**  0.000  0.98 
  -0.001  1.40 
 
Fixed effects:     
     
     
       
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y     
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y     
F-test (p-value)  0.12   
  0.86   
  --   
  --   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.81   
  0.81   
  0.89   
  0.65   
 
Observations  142   
  129   
  263   
  275   
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Table 4 
Does securitization predict worse future performance? (H1): Loan rating changes 
This table compares downgrades and upgrades in loan ratings for securitized and unsecuritized loans. The unit of observation 
for the analysis is a loan. The dependent variable in the regressions is a dummy that indicates whether a loan was downgraded or 
upgraded in a given period after loan origination. Letter ratings have been converted into a numerical scale (1=AAA, 2=AA+, 3=AA, 
etc.) where credit watch negative or positive counts at + or – 0.5, respectively.  Borrowers are considered to be ―downgraded‖ or 
―upgraded‖ when the numerical rating changes. Ratings data comes from Reuters Gold Sheets (compiled from S&P and Moody‘s) and 
covers the period from May 2001 through April 2010. The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. 
The portfolio sample includes loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. The 2005-2007 dummy equals one for loans 
originated between 2005 and 2007, zero otherwise. Securitized in 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction term reflecting the marginal 
effect for loans securitized between 2005 and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical test of the null hypothesis that Securitized 
+ Securitized in 2005-2007=0. Other variable definitions are the same as in Table 1. All specifications include fixed effects for the year 
of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating at origination, and the identity of the loan lead arranger. We use 
the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating fixed effects are relative to the 
omitted category unrated.  All specifications are estimated using a linear model to maintain consistency across samples; specifications for 
the at-origination sample (in this table and in Table 9) require interaction effects which present issues in nonlinear models. Results for the 
portfolio sample regressions, which do not feature an interaction effect, are qualitatively unchanged using a probit specification. Standard 
errors are clustered by loan lead arranger. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Downgrades 
 
  At-origination sample    Portfolio sample 
  1-year horizon  2-year horizon    1-year horizon  2-year horizon 
  Coeff  z-stat
  Coeff  z-stat
    Coeff.  z-stat
  Coef
f.. 
z-stat
 
Securitized (dummy)  0.03  0.61 
  -0.01  0.11 
    --   
  --   
 
Securitized in 2005-2007  0.10  0.49 
  0.15  0.61 
    0.00  0.09 
  0.12  2.35 
** 
Borrower characteristics:     
     
       
     
 
  Log(Assetst-1)  0.01  0.20 
  0.03  0.46 
    0.02  1.20 
  -0.02  0.61 
 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  -1.21  1.66 
*  -1.39  2.12 
**    0.28  1.59 
  0.03  0.09 
 
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.10  0.61 
  -0.18  0.93 
    -0.06  0.65 
  -0.13  1.80 
* 
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.00  1.43 
  0.01  2.42 
**    0.00  0.30 
  -0.00  0.71 
 
Loan characteristics:     
     
       
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  0.02  0.24 
  -0.06  0.64 
    -0.10  0.82 
  -0.12  0.98 
 
  Log(Loan size)  0.01  0.09 
  -0.06  0.80 
    -0.01  0.25 
  0.03  0.83 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  -0.00  0.97 
  -0.00  1.79 
*    0.00  1.13 
  0.00  0.50 
 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  -0.13  1.82 
*  -0.14  3.02 
***    -0.06  1.57 
  -0.06  1.47 
 
  LBO loan (dummy)  -0.06  0.50 
  -0.01  0.07 
    -0.05  0.86 
  -0.09  0.96 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.10  0.76 
  -0.21  1.71 
*    0.01  0.26 
  -0.05  0.75 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.03  0.34 
  -0.14  1.14 
    -0.10  1.34 
  0.01  0.09 
 
Fixed effects:   
   
     
   
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.43   
  0.52   
    --   
  --   
 
Adj. R-squared  0.09   
  0.09   
    0.07   
  0.03   
 
Observations  213      227   
    414   
  420   
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Table 4 – continued 
Panel B: Upgrades 
 
  At-origination sample    Portfolio sample 
  1-year horizon  2-year horizon    1-year horizon  2-year horizon 
  Coeff  z-stat
  Coeff  z-stat
    Coeff.  z-stat
  Coef
f.. 
z-stat
 
Securitized (dummy)  0.08  0.73 
  0.04  0.46 
    --   
  --   
 
Securitized in 2005-2007  -0.14  0.77 
  -0.35  2.26 
**    -0.04  0.83 
  -0.00  0.00 
 
Borrower characteristics:     
     
       
     
 
  Log(Assetst-1)  -0.07  1.39 
  -0.07  1.02 
    0.03  1.72 
*  0.03  1.36 
 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  0.15  0.29 
  0.09  0.15 
    -0.11  0.50 
  -0.55  2.18 
** 
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.10  0.31 
  0.21  0.78 
    -0.01  0.11 
  -0.03  0.32 
 
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.00  0.21 
  0.00  0.53 
    0.00  0.10 
  0.00  0.78 
 
Loan characteristics:     
     
       
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  0.00  0.04 
  0.06  0.47 
    -0.03  0.21 
  -0.07  0.42 
 
  Log(Loan size)  0.10  2.00 
**  0.10  1.57 
    0.01  0.55 
  0.02  0.78 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  -0.00  0.01 
  0.00  0.47 
    -0.00  0.52 
  0.00  0.13 
 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  0.09  2.16 
**  0.12  2.38 
**    0.04  0.96 
  0.04  0.77 
 
  LBO loan (dummy)  0.04  0.28 
  -0.07  0.48 
    0.06  0.94 
  0.05  1.65 
* 
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.05  0.53 
  -0.18  1.25 
    -0.01  0.12 
  -0.00  0.03 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.08  1.08 
  -0.10  0.79 
    -0.05  0.61 
  0.00  0.07 
 
Fixed effects:   
   
     
   
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.62   
  0.01   
    --   
  --   
 
Adj. R-squared  0.15   
  0.02   
    0.02   
  0.10   
 
Observations  213      227        414   
  420   
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Table 5 
Does securitization predict worse future performance? (H1): CDS spread 
This table compares the change in spreads on senior debt credit default swaps (CDS) for securitized loan borrowers with that of 
unsecuritized borrowers. The unit of observation for the analysis is a loan. The dependent variable is the percentage change in a 
borrower‘s CDS spread in a given period after the loan origination. CDS data comes from Markit and corresponds to 5-year contracts. 
CDS quotes are available for the period 2003 through June 2009. The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and 
May 2007. The portfolio sample includes loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. Securitized in 2005-2007 is essentially 
an interaction term reflecting the marginal effect for loans securitized between 2005 and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical 
test of the null hypothesis that Securitized + Securitized in 2005-2007=0. Other variable definitions are the same as in Table 1. 
Specifications include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating at origination, 
and the identity of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies for BB+, BB, 
and BB-. Rating fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated.  In the at-origination sample, we omit some of the borrower-
level fixed effects due to the small sample size. Standard errors are clustered by loan lead arranger. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % 
levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
  At-origination sample  Portfolio sample 
 
0-12 months        
post-event 
13-24 months 
 post-event 
0-12 months       
post-event 
13-24 months        
post-event 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat    Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat   
Securitized (dummy)  -0.91  1.04 
  0.42  0.89 
  --   
  --     
Securitized in 2005-2007  -0.01  0.00 
  -2.21  2.28 
**  0.34  1.36 
  0.24  0.78 
 
Borrower characteristics:   
     
     
     
 
  Realized CDS vol.  0.02  1.25 
  0.00  0.94 
  0.00  0.67 
  0.01  4.09 
*** 
Loan characteristics:     
     
     
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  -1.62  2.87 
***  -0.16  0.75 
  -0.05  0.08 
  -0.64  1.27 
 
  Log(Loan size)  -0.40  0.25 
  -0.32  3.15 
***  0.06  0.73 
  -0.08  0.62 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  -0.01  1.75 
*  -0.00  3.12 
***  -0.00  0.23 
  -0.00  0.23 
 
  Performance pricing  -1.24  0.65 
  0.14  0.75 
  0.04  0.30 
  0.50  2.55 
** 
  LBO loan (dummy)  0.74  0.49 
  0.72  1.25 
  0.21  0.99 
  0.42  0.57 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  4.30  3.72 
***  3.97  10.7 
***  0.27  1.06 
  -0.04  0.05 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  -2.41  1.97 
**  1.55  2.13 
**  -0.50  1.34 
  0.41  0.98 
 
Fixed effects:     
     
     
       
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  N/N   
  N/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y     
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/ Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y     
F-test (p-value)  0.71   
  0.02   
  --   
  --   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.54   
  0.73   
  0.62   
  0.59   
 
Observations  24   
  44   
  157   
  170   
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Table 6 
Does securitization predict worse future performance? (H1): Implied probability of default 
This table compares post-origination changes in implied probability of default (Π) for borrowers whose loans were securitized 
and borrowers whose loans were not securitized.  Implied default probabilities are calculated using the reduced form Merton (1974)-style 
approach described in Bharath and Shumway (2008).  The unit of observation for the analysis is a loan. The dependent variable is the 
change in the borrower‘s implied 1-year default probability over the window. The t-1 implied default probability (Πt-1) is measured as of 
month-end in the month before loan origination. The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. The 
portfolio sample includes loans originated between January 2005 and July 2007. Securitized in 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction 
term reflecting the marginal effect for loans securitized between 2005 and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical test of the null 
hypothesis that Securitized + Securitized in 2005-2007=0. Other variable definitions are the same as in Table 1.  All specifications 
include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating at origination, and the identity 
of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating 
fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated.  Standard errors are clustered by loan lead arranger in all specifications. 
Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
  At-origination sample  Portfolio sample 
 
0-12 months          
post-event 
13-24 months 
 post-event 
0-12 months 
post-event 
13-24 months        
post-event 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat    Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat   
Securitized (dummy)  -0.01  0.19 
  0.11  1.42 
  --   
  --     
Securitized in 2005-2007  -0.01  0.03 
  -0.11  0.38
7 
  0.02  0.68 
  0.03  0.75 
 
Borrower characteristics:   
     
     
     
 
  Log(Assetst-1)  -0.08  1.46 
  0.08  0.92 
  -0.04  1.65 
*  0.05  1.54 
 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.32  0.81 
  -0.77  1.22 
  -0.04  0.13 
  -0.58  1.95 
* 
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.32  1.73 
*  0.27  1.68 
*  -0.04  0.53 
  0.15  1.37 
 
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.00  0.71 
  -0.00  0.01 
  0.00  1.64 
*  0.00  0.88 
 
  Π t-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.69  3.09 
***  -0.36  1.41 
  -0.60  5.84 
***  -0.22  2.16 
** 
Loan characteristics:     
     
     
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  -0.26  1.39 
  0.33  3.16 
***  0.12  1.30 
  0.05  0.35 
 
  Log(Loan size)  0.15  3.12 
***  -0.11  1.28 
  0.01  0.37 
  -0.03  0.78 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  -0.00  0.16 
  0.00  1.17 
  0.00  1.59 
  0.00  1.65 
* 
  Perf. pricing  0.05  0.67 
  -0.05  0.39 
  0.02  0.83 
  0.01  0.27 
 
  LBO loan (dummy)  -0.10  1.93 
*  -0.05  0.53 
  -0.03  0.38 
  0.04  0.55 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.03  0.24 
  -0.02  0.09 
  -0.06  1.41 
  0.10  1.99 
** 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  -0.02  0.24 
  -0.02  0.15 
  -0.04  0.92 
  0.05  0.65 
 
Fixed effects:     
     
     
     
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.92   
  0.99   
  --   
  --   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.49   
  0.34   
  0.30   
  0.28   
 
Observations  146   
  136   
  262   
  244   
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Table 7 
Loan selection under CLO demand pressure (quasi-experiment) 
This table seeks to address a potential selection bias. We replicated results in Tables 3-6 using three alternative proxies for CLO demand for loans. The basic idea is to 
look at the marginal quality of loans securitized in periods when the CLO demand for loans is generally high. In addition to controls used in the analysis in Tables 3 to 6 we 
include a fund-flow proxy and its interaction with the Securitized dummy. Coefficients on benchmark controls and fund-flow proxies are omitted for compactness of presentation. 
The table reports coefficients of interest for 44 different regressions (11 specifications x 4 measures of demand). CLO issuance (in billions) is equivalent to CLO fund flow. CLO 
pipeline (in billions) is the accumulation of CLOs in the pipeline, i.e., excess demand for loans by CLOs. CLO issuance scaled by total term loan issuance is also likely to reflect 
imbalances in demand. For robustness, we also report results for net cash flow into institutional accounts scaled by total term loan issuance, which reflects imbalances in 
institutional demand for loans more broadly. The analysis is done using the at-origination sample which includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. Fund flow data is 
available from 2001 through 2009. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
      CLO demand proxy:     Net cash flows into 
inst. investors/       
Term loan issuance        CLO issuance  CLO pipeline 
CLO issuance/    
Term loan issuance   
Table  Dependent variable  Explanatory variable  Coeff.  Stat.    Coeff.  Stat.    Coeff.  Stat.      Coeff.  Stat.   
Tbl. 3  Loan price (1-12 month)  Securitized  -0.011  1.48 
  -0.008  2.11 
**  -0.011  0.65 
    -0.003  0.39 
 
    Securitized*CLO demand  0.000  0.51    0.000  0.14    0.036  0.24 
    -0.050  0.74   
Tbl. 3  Loan price (13-24 month)  Securitized  0.107  1.01 
  0.011  0.41 
  0.107  0.93 
    0.063  0.95 
 
    Securitized*CLO demand  -0.014  1.23    -0.039  1.23    -0.684  0.56 
    0.166  0.30 
 
Tbl. 4.a  Downgrade (1-year)  Securitized  -0.152  1.98 
**  -0.024  0.38    0.031  0.15 
    0.039  0.49   
    Securitized*CLO demand  0.021  1.51    -0.009  0.16    -0.339  0.15      -0.211  0.15   
Tbl. 4.a  Downgrade (2-year)  Securitized  -0.287  1.84 
*  -0.076  0.63    -0.033  0.13      -0.059  0.36   
    Securitized*CLO demand  0.032  1.98 
**  -0.052  1.03    -0.544  0.26      -0.420  0.22   
Tbl. 4.b  Upgrade (1-year)  Securitized  0.092  0.66    0.032  0.35    0.034  0.27      0.071  0.63   
    Securitized*CLO demand  -0.008  0.84    0.021  0.99    0.084  0.09      -1.273  1.39 
 
Tbl. 4.b  Upgrade (2-year)  Securitized  0.081  0.47    -0.075  0.74    -0.026  0.22      -0.066  0.53   
    Securitized*CLO demand  -0.021  1.35    0.036  1.25 
  -0.299  0.30      0.425  0.35   
Tbl. 5  CDS (1-12 month)  Securitized  0.065  0.09    -1.063  0.91    0.494  0.35 
    -1.285  1.12   
    Securitized*CLO demand  -0.128  0.79    0.119  0.26    -22.71  0.81 
    -0.929  0.16   
Tbl. 5  CDS (13-24 month)  Securitized  0.776  0.90    0.382  1.10    2.105  0.94 
    -0.391  0.75   
    Securitized*CLO demand  -0.125  1.29    -0.431  3.04 
***  -20.53  0.95 
    4.238  0.86   
Tbl. 6  Π (0-12 month)   Securitized  -0.127  1.80 
*  0.005  0.11    -0.156  0.89 
    0.045  0.87 
 
    Securitized*CLO demand  0.030  2.92 
***  0.009  0.39 
  1.944  1.06 
    0.216  0.49 
 
Tbl. 6  Π (12-24 month)  Securitized  -0.054  0.32 
  -0.013  0.13    -0.323  1.77 
*    -0.095  0.81 
 
    Securitized*CLO demand  0.002  0.09    0.070  1.21 
  3.002  2.22 
**    0.242  0.15 
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Table 8 
Does securitization by the originator predict worse future performance? (H2): Secondary market loan prices 
This table compares the change in secondary market loan prices following loan origination for borrowers whose loans were 
securitized by their lead arranger versus other securitized loans in the same CLO portfolio. The sample only includes securitized loans. 
The unit of observation for the analysis is CLO x loan. For each loan we use prices corresponding to the relevant facility (i.e., we only 
use one facility per loan). The dependent variable is the percentage change in the average monthly loan price in a given period after loan 
origination. We use mid-quotes (i.e., the average between bid and ask spread). Facility level controls include facility size as a percentage 
of the total deal size, and a dummy equal to 1when facility starts after the loan origination date (coefficient on the latter is not reported 
because it only affects one specification.) The focus is on the Same bank dummy equal to 1 when a loan appears in a CLO underwritten 
by its lead arranger and 0 otherwise. Same bank 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction term reflecting the marginal effect for loans 
originated between 2005 and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical test of the null hypothesis that Same bank + Same bank 
2005-2007=0. All specifications include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and 
rating at origination, and the identity of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate 
dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated.  Standard errors are clustered by loan. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively.  
 
  At-origination sample 
 
0-12 months  
post-event 
13-24 months 
post-event 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat   
Same bank (dummy)  0.001  1.99 
**  0.009  2.24 
** 
Same bank, 2005-2007  0.001  1.04 
  -0.014  2.11 
** 
Borrower characteristics:   
     
 
  Realized price volatility  -1.855  36.5 
***  0.487  0.86 
 
Loan characteristics:     
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  0.387  2.45 
**  0.903  1.93 
* 
  Log(Loan size)  -0.011  2.10 
**  0.018  0.88 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  0.001  4.50 
***  0.001  1.66 
* 
  Performance pricing  0.004  0.86 
  0.049  2.05 
** 
  LBO loan (dummy)  -0.030  3.32 
***  -0.106  2.74 
*** 
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.064  7.12 
***  -0.028  0.60 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  -0.012  0.92 
  0.179  4.50 
*** 
  Facility size (% of deal)  -0.000  1.17 
  -0.005  5.85 
*** 
Fixed effects:     
     
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.14   
  0.18   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.99   
  0.99   
 
Observations  877   
  791   
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Table 9 
Does securitization by the originator predict worse future performance? (H2): Loan rating changes 
This table compares the post-origination downgrade and upgrade frequency loans that sold to a CLO underwritten by their lead 
arranger with other loans securitized in the same portfolio. The sample only includes securitized loans. The unit of observation for the 
analysis is CLO x loan. The dependent variable in the regressions is a dummy that indicates whether a loan was downgraded or upgraded 
in a given period after the loan origination date. Letter ratings have been converted into a numerical scale (1=AAA, 2=AA+, 3=AA, etc.) 
where credit watch negative or positive counts at + or – 0.5, respectively.  Borrowers are considered to be ―downgraded‖ or ―upgraded‖ 
when the numerical rating changes. The focus is on the Same bank dummy equal to 1 when a loan appears in a CLO underwritten by its 
lead arranger and 0 otherwise. Same bank 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction term reflecting the marginal effect for loans originated 
between 2005 and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical test of the null hypothesis that Same bank + Same bank 2005-2007=0. 
All specifications are estimated using a linear model. Ratings data comes from Reuters Gold Sheets (compiled from S&P and Moody‘s) 
and covers the period from May 2001 through April 2010. Variable definitions are the same as in Table 1. All specifications include 
fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating at origination, and the identity of the 
loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating fixed 
effects are relative to the omitted category unrated. Standard errors are clustered by loan. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is 
indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Downgrades 
 
  At-origination sample 
  1-year horizon
    2-year horizon
 
  Coeff.  z-stat
      Coeff.  z-stat
   
Same bank (dummy)  0.06  1.45 
    0.004  0.10   
Same bank, 2005-2007  -0.01  0.14 
    0.08  0.83   
Borrower characteristics:   
       
   
  Log(Assetst-1)  0.06  0.96 
    0.17  2.34 
** 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  -1.06  1.85 
*    -0.77  1.29 
 
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.02  0.12 
    -0.04  0.26 
 
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.01  1.77 
*    0.01  2.47 
** 
Loan characteristics:   
       
   
  Log(Loan maturity)  0.13  1.01 
    -0.11  1.01 
 
  Log(Loan size)  -0.06  0.82 
    -0.14  1.84 
* 
  All-in-drawn spread  0.00  1.26 
    -0.00  2.01 
** 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  -0.17  1.58 
    -0.29  3.34 
*** 
  LBO loan (dummy)  0.01  0.09 
    0.12  0.70 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  0.01  0.05 
    -0.00  0.02 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.22  1.82 
*    0.36  1.91 
* 
Fixed effects:     
       
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.47   
    0.33   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.49   
    0.59   
 
Observations  1,228        1,334   
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Table 9 – continued 
 
Panel B: Upgrades 
 
 
  At-origination sample 
  1-year horizon
    2-year horizon
 
  Coeff.  z-stat
      Coeff.  z-stat
   
Same bank (dummy)  -0.04  1.03 
    -0.04  0.99   
Same bank, 2005-2007  -0.001  0.01 
    0.03  0.36   
Borrower characteristics:   
       
   
  Log(Assetst-1)  -0.20  2.96 
***    -0.13  1.58   
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  0.24  0.56 
    0.19  0.40   
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.32  2.21 
**    -0.06  0.33   
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.01  2.51 
**    -0.00  0.61   
Loan characteristics:   
       
   
  Log(Loan maturity)  -0.03  0.27 
    0.08  0.62   
  Log(Loan size)  0.06  0.84 
    0.03  0.33   
  All-in-drawn spread  -0.00  0.77 
    0.00  0.50   
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  0.15  1.84 
*    0.30  2.62 
*** 
  LBO loan (dummy)  -0.15  0.93 
    -0.26  1.53   
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.44  3.26 
***    -0.35  1.95 
* 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  0.18  1.04 
    0.16  0.85   
Fixed effects:     
       
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  Y/Y   
    Y/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.50   
    0.90   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.43   
    0.33   
 
Observations  1,228        1,334   
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Table 10 
Does securitization by the originator predict worse future performance? (H2): Implied probability of default 
This table compares post-origination changes in implied probability of default (Π) for borrowers whose loans were securitized 
and borrowers whose loans were not securitized.  Implied default probabilities are calculated using the reduced form Merton (1974)-style 
approach described in Bharath and Shumway (2008).  The unit of observation for the analysis is a loan. The dependent variable is the 
change in the borrower‘s implied 1-year default probability over the window. The t-1 implied default probability (Πt-1) is measured as of 
month-end in the month before loan origination. The sample only includes securitized loans. The unit of observation for the analysis is 
CLO x loan. The focus is on the Same bank dummy which is equal to 1 when a loan appears in a CLO underwritten by its lead arranger 
and 0 otherwise. Same bank 2005-2007 is essentially an interaction term reflecting the marginal effect for loans originated between 2005 
and 2007. The p-value corresponds to the statistical test of the null hypothesis that Same bank + Same bank 2005-2007=0. Specifications 
include fixed effects for the year of loan origination, the borrower‘s industry (2-digit SIC code) and rating at origination, and the identity 
of the loan lead arranger. We use the most granular rating information; e.g., we include separate dummies for BB+, BB, and BB-. Rating 
fixed effects are relative to the omitted category unrated.  We omit year fixed effects because the number of same bank loans is small 
(150 observations) and the estimation requires enough loans for a within-portfolio comparison with fixed effects.  The results are robust 
to alternatively excluding other types of fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by loan. Variable definitions are the same as in Table 
1. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
  At-origination sample 
 
0-12 months       
post-event 
13-24 months      
post-event 
  Coeff.  t-stat 
  Coeff.  t-stat   
Same bank (dummy)  -0.009  1.59 
  0.002  0.15 
 
Same bank 2005-2007  -0.058  1.00 
  0.002  0.05 
 
Borrower characteristics:   
     
 
  Log(Assetst-1)  -0.15  3.46 
***  -0.04  0.76 
 
  ROAt-1 (ind. adj.)  -1.55  2.62 
***  0.50  0.31 
 
  Leveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  -0.18  1.03 
  0.92  3.70 
*** 
  Coveraget-1 (ind. adj.)  0.00  0.60 
  -0.01  2.97 
*** 
  Π t-1 (ind. adj.)  -1.11  6.62 
***  0.60  1.02 
 
Loan characteristics:     
     
 
  Log(Loan maturity)  -0.34  4.82 
***  0.51  4.17 
*** 
  Log(Loan size)  0.19  2.40 
**  -0.10  0.66 
 
  All-in-drawn spread  0.00  3.31 
***  -0.00  0.56 
 
  Perf. pricing (dummy)  -0.09  1.14 
  0.11  1.34 
 
  LBO loan (dummy)  0.03  0.24 
  -0.30  1.11 
 
  M&A loan (dummy)  -0.37  3.24 
***  0.16  0.81 
 
  Debt repayment (dummy)  -0.05  0.50 
  -0.25  1.66 
* 
Fixed effects:     
     
 
  Borrower: Industry/Rating  Y/Y   
  Y/Y   
 
  Loan: Year/Lead  N/Y   
  N/Y   
 
F-test (p-value)  0.26   
  0.90   
 
Adjusted R-squared  0.98   
  0.96   
 
Observations  748   
  732   
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Table 11 
Robustness check: frequency of covenant violations 
This table compares the frequency of covenant violations across groups of loans that correspond to the two hypotheses tested in the paper. The unit of observation for the 
analysis is a loan. Number of financial covenants is the number of covenants on the loan at origination. Covenant violations were compiled from loan amendments remarks as 
reported in DealScan. The at-origination sample includes loans originated between 1997 and May 2007. The portfolio sample includes loans originated between January 2005 and 
July 2007. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
*, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Does securitization predict worse future performance? (H1) 
                           
    At-origination sample    Portfolio sample 
    Originated 1997-2004    Originated 2005-2007    Originated 2005-2007 
    Securitized:      Securitized:      Securitized:     
    Yes  No  t-stat    Yes  No  t-stat    Yes  No  t-stat   
Number of loans    245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
Number of financial covenants  Obs.  245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
  Mean  3.28  3.56  2.04 
**  2.56  2.24  1.01 
  0.77  0.57  4.50 
*** 
  Median  3.00  4.00      3.00  2.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  1.52  1.08      1.54  1.42      1.29  1.18     
Covenant violation, 0-12 mo.  Obs.  245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
  Mean  0.02  0.03  0.12    0.05  0.00  1.36    0.00  0.00  1.32 
 
   Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.15  0.16      0.23  0.00      0.00  0.04     
Covenant violation, 13-24 mo.  Obs.  245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
  Mean  0.04  0.05  0.56    0.02  0.00  0.77    0.00  0.00  0.23 
 
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.20  0.22      0.13  0.00      0.03  0.03     
Covenant violation, after 24mo.  Obs.  245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
  Mean  0.03  0.02  0.75    0.00  0.00  --    0.00  0.00  1.38   
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.18  0.14      0.00  0.00      0.04  0.02     
Covenant violation ever  Obs.  245  151      57  34      1,084  2,508     
  Mean  0.07  0.07  0.27    0.05  0.00  1.36    0.00  0.00  0.21 
 
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.26  0.25      0.23  0.00      0.05  0.06     
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Table 11 – continued 
 
Panel B:  Does securitization by the originator predict worse future performance? (H2) 
                   
    At-origination sample   
    Originated 1997-2004    Originated 2005-2007   
    Same bank:      Same bank:     
    Yes  No  t-stat    Yes  No  t-stat   
Number of loans    80  165      24  33     
Number of financial covenants  Obs.  80  165      24  33     
  Mean  3.24  3.30  0.32 
  2.54  2.58  0.08 
 
  Median  3.00  4.00      2.50  3.00     
  SD  1.22  1.64      1.72  1.41     
Covenant violation, 0-12 mo.  Obs.  80  165      24  33     
  Mean  0.03  0.02  0.04    0.04  0.06  0.31   
   Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.16  0.15      0.20  0.24     
Covenant violation, 13-24 mo.  Obs.  80  165      24  33     
  Mean  0.03  0.05  0.87    0.00  0.03  0.85   
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.16  0.22      0.00  0.17     
Covenant violation, after 24mo.  Obs.  80  165      24  33     
  Mean  0.03  0.04  0.47    0.00  0.00  --   
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.16  0.19      0.00  0.00     
Covenant violation ever  Obs.  80  165      24  33     
  Mean  0.05  0.08  0.98    0.04  0.06  0.31   
  Median  0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00     
  SD  0.22  0.28      0.20  0.24     
 
 